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Status of Power Markets and Power  
Exchanges in Asia and Australia 
 
Integration of electric power systems and power exchanges among countries, regions and 
companies is an objective tendency in world power industry development. The Asian region 
is rather promising in this respect since the sources of energy resources for electricity pro-
duction are often very remote from the load centers. Besides, there are the so-called system 
effects from electric power systems integration that are beneficial for all the participants. The 
role of power exchanges increases still further under deregulated electricity markets particu-
larly in terms of the possibilities to decrease the market prices of electricity. 
 
The following viewpoints are discussed in this Chapter: 
 Ideas of the different countries in Asia and Oceania of either the positive or negative 
role of power exchanges in a market environment; 
 Estimations of potential limits in the power exchanges and substantiation of such limits 
if there are any; 
 Concrete results of the studies on power exchanges in the feasibility studies of prospec-
tive projects of power exchanges. 
 
9.1 Status of Reform and Power Exchange in India: Trading, Scheduling,  
and Real Time Operation Regional Grids  
Though India opened up its power sector in nineties to private sector investment, initial 
impact was mainly in the form of generation addition and then with unbundling of genera-
tion, transmission and distribution, to some extent on the last segment also. Transmission as 
natural monopoly remains still under government-owned companies, both at central and 
state level, though right at the beginning of 1998 specifically it was opened to private enter-
prises to build, own and operate from point to point. With the open access in inter-state 
transmission to any distribution company, trader, generating company, captive plant or any 
permitted consumer as per November 2003 order1 of Central Electricity Regulatory Com-
mission (CERC) certain changes are, however, taking place. Under such circumstance 
changes in methodology of generation scheduling to meet demand are also inevitable to 
take into account this very aspect from time to time considering role of various participants 
in power market. However, at the same time aspect of system security vis-à-vis stability is 
given due importance in real time grid operation, as envisaged also under Electricity Act 
20032. 
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9.1.1 Development of Indian Power System3,4 
India has a federal structure with 28 States, 7 Union Territories and a Central Govt. Present 
installed capacity of India is 112 GW with 25% of hydro besides nuclear, gas, wind and con-
ventional thermal plants. For the purpose of power system, the country was demarcated 
into five geo-political regions in the year 1964 and gradually different states within the re-
gion got integrated and by the 1980s five mature regional grids were under operation. In 
1992 Eastern and Northeastern regions were interconnected. In 2002 the Northeast, East and 
West with a span of 2800 km. of synchronous grid became operational. There are four 
HVDC Back–to–Back stations of 500 / 1000 MW capacity each and three Bi-pole HVDC long 
lines for carrying bulk power. Indian power system also has multiple connections at differ-
ent voltage levels with neighboring countries, like, Nepal and Bhutan. Cross border power 
exchanges are progressively increasing. There is wealth of experience regarding expansion 
of the grids and experience of operating large grids. 
 
Resources are unevenly spread with hydrocarbon deposits in the East and Central parts of 
India and huge hydro potential in the Northeastern and Northern part of the Northern Grid. 
There is a promising availability of gas on the long coastal lines. The load growth has also 
been uneven with widely varying per capita income in different states. This calls for transfer 
of large blocks of power over long distances. 
 
Central Electricity Authority, a statutory organization produces the national plans. Inte-
grated resource planning approach is adopted. Transmission system expansion is coordi-
nated for achieving a most optimal plan with least investment. Perspective plan and the 
long-term forecasting are also carried out by the Authority. 
 
The Legislations on Electricity in India traversed a long distance and all the old act since1910 
onwards have been merged and recast in the form of a consolidated Electricity Act 2003. 
Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC) and the State Electricity Grid Code (SEGC) are in place 
after public debate. The Regulators, Authorities and the state utilities are framing rules and 
Regulations. The Central Electricity Authority is developing metering codes. 
 
Indian Electricity Act 2003 envisages Electricity Regulators at State level (State Electricity 
Regulatory Commission, SERC) to take care of intra-state affairs while the Central regulator 
(Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, CERC) to take care of inter-state matters. The 
tariffs, codes and directions on Open Access are now being issued by the Regulators in a fair 
and transparent way and the Government is distancing itself. 
 
Transmission has been recognized as a separate activity in 1998 by the legislation. In line 
with the federal structure the Central Transmission Utility (CTU, at present Power Grid 
Corporation of India) and the State Transmission Utilities (STU, at present Transmission / 
Grid Company TRANCO or GRIDCO of the concerned state) have been created for coordi-
nated development of the transmission segment. Transmission being a natural monopoly is 
a regulated entity and barred from trading as per the law. Transmission system in India has 
developed from 132/220 kV and now well-meshed 400 kV mature grid forms the backbone 
of Indian Grid. A rapid development is envisaged by the year 2012 matching with load 
growth and generation addition of 100,000 MW. 
By and large the GENCO (Generating Company), TRANSCO and DISCO (Distribution 
Company), STU, CTU, SLDCs (State Load Dispatch Centers), RLDCs (Regional Load Dis-
patch Centers) and CERC structure has been followed while progressing with reforms and 
unbundling. There are variations in the models being adopted by different states. Some of 
the states have already privatized their distribution systems. 
 
The Indian sub-continent with its vast geographical distances and diverse resources is 
struggling to achieve cost reduction through ‘Economy of Scale’. The large size generators of 
660 MW are being added as 500 MW sets have already stabilized and are dominating pre-
sently. For transferring large blocks of power, 765 kV transmission system has been envi-
saged overlaying 400 kV meshed network. 
 
Private participation in generation by way of IPPs (Independent Power Producers) and 
Mega Power Projects supplemented with Government investment is envisaged. So far the 
transmission has been through the State / Central Government companies. Joint venture 
and IPTC (Independent Power Transmission Company) route have also been launched to 
attract private investment in the transmission segment. With unbundling and demarcated 
distribution companies, niche market is being created for private participants to enter into 
the field of Distribution. With Open Access, investment in captive power plants is likely to 
get a boost, as they would have access to enter the Indian power market. 
 
765 kV transmission systems connecting the regions and the resource-rich areas and load 
centers would form a super highway for wheeling of power from source to sink. A massive 
capacity addition plan of 50,000 MW of hydro and 100,000 MW of thermal power has been 
launched and expected to yield result by the year 2012. 
 
The variety of diversities between the different regions of India and its neighboring coun-
tries open a vast potential for coordinated expansion and operation to take care of time, sea-
son and resource diversity prevailing in the sub-continent. It would also enable to level the 
diversity caused by various uncertainties, like, investment, load growth, etc.  
 
9.1.2 Grid Operation 
The Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC) lays down rules, guidelines and standards to be 
followed by the various participants in the system to plan, develop, maintain and operate 
the power system in the most efficient, reliable and economic manner while facilitating 
healthy competition in the generation and supply of electricity. The IEGC covers roles of 
different organizations and their linkages, planning codes, connection conditions, operating 
codes, scheduling and dispatch codes, metering and management of the grid code. 
 
The regional grids in India are operating as loose power pools in which the constituents 
have full autonomy and have the total responsibility for scheduling and dispatching their 
own resources, arranging any bilateral inter-change and regulating their drawl from the 
regional grid. 
 
The Regional Load Dispatch Centers coordinate the entire activity of day-ahead scheduling. 
For the purpose of scheduling and settlement a day is divided into 96 blocks of 15 minutes 
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The Indian Electricity Grid Code (IEGC) lays down rules, guidelines and standards to be 
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each. The shared generation resources declare their availability and RLDCs communicate 
the entitlement to all the stakeholders. Based on the load-generation availability and eco-
nomics, all the constituents furnish their requisition from the shared resources that are ag-
gregated by the RLDCs and communicated to the shared generators. These are based on the 
long-term contracts and allocation normally done by the Central Government in consulta-
tion with the State Governments. 
 
On day-to-day basis the utilities enter into bilateral agreements of different kinds. The 
SLDCs and RLDCs incorporate the same in the schedule provided there is no network con-
gestion. In case of congestion the same are moderated by the SLDCs / RLDCs. There is an 
elaborate time line for the scheduling and dispatch procedure. Provisions also exist for re-
vising and modifying the schedules by any of the participant in case of contingency for 
which at least six time blocks, i.e., one and a half hour notice is required. The scheduling is 
carried out through a web-based scheduler and all the revisions are posted on the web in a 
transparent way. At the end of the day the final schedule becomes the datum for calculation 
of ‘Unscheduled Interchange’ as well as payment of energy charges. In other words the 
schedules are Commitments / Contracts and payment of energy is decided and finalized 
based on the finally implemented schedules. 
 
At present there are few Traders licensed to operate in the Inter-state Trading. Traders are 
given different categories of license depending on the volume of transactions and the Regu-
latory Commission assesses the financial capacity and other parameters of the Traders be-
fore issuance of license. Traders are to file the periodic Returns to the Regulator furnishing 
the details of the transactions.  
 
The Open Access Regulations stipulated by the Commission and the Procedures framed by 
the Central Transmission Utility is followed by the Open Access customers, which are pri-
marily the Traders. The Open Access Regulations enacted in 2003 are undergoing speedy 
refinements based on the experience of various stakeholders including the Operators. The 
volume of trading has grown phenomenally and huge number of transactions has already 
taken place. 
 
Load Dispatch Centers have been declared as an apex body both at the State level and at 
Regional level, i.e., SLDCs and RLDCs. The National Load Dispatch Center (NLDC) has also 
been conceived to take care of inter-regional and cross boarder exchanges. Load Dispatch 
Centers are also barred from trading activity and are ‘no profit no loss’ centers with fees and 
charges being determined by the Regulators. Since both transmission and system operation 
are neutral to the market and barred from trading activity, at present Indian power system 
is having synergy with transmission and Grid operation. The Load Dispatch Centers both at 
Regional and State levels have been upgraded with state-of-the-art technology. 
 
Each region acts as a pool. Control areas are demarcated with each state and shared genera-
tors being separate entity and there are many participants in the pool. After much debate 
and in consonance with the federal structure, India has opted for loose power pool and de-
centralized market.  
The settlement system has undergone drastic evolution in recent years. A new scientific set-
tlement system popularly known as ‘Availability Based Tariff’ (ABT) has been introduced in 
all the five regions in the country in a staggered fashion. The new mechanism has three 
parts, viz. capacity charges linked to the availability of the generation, scheduled energy 
charges based on the requisition and the schedules by the control areas. 
 
The unique and the third component is termed as ‘Unscheduled Interchange’ (UI), which is 
deviation from the schedule and its pricing is linked to frequency. The UI mechanism has a 
self-healing property, brings in equilibrium and emulates all the properties of ‘Non-
Cooperation Game Theory’ automatically. The mechanism while causing economy also 
complements reliability, yet maintaining the sovereignty of the utilities giving choice and 
freedom. 
 
Besides long-term (25 years) and short-term day-ahead, spot / balancing market by way of 
UI mechanism where the prices are linked to the frequency has been created. The spot prices 
are linked to frequency that is said to be collectively controlled and effectively stabilized. It 
does not require elaborate calculations. Regulators tinker the UI vector from time to time in 
order to achieve economy and reliability by creating a pseudo competitor.  
 
Unlike other Pools the Pricing Mechanism of Unscheduled Interchange, i.e., Schedule minus 
Actual is linked to frequency. The Central Regulator after public hearing and debate notifies 
the UI price curve. The slope of the curve, kinks, upper and lower ceilings are arrived at by 
the Regulator with a view to cause overall economy as well as quality in the grid.  
 
The fundamental theory of equilibrium and the negative feedback has been adopted while 
deciding the UI price curve. As UI price is linked to frequency and as it is known that fre-
quency deviations represent surplus and shortage situation, accordingly the UI price varies 
with real-time shortage or surplus. In other words, as the surplus emerges, frequency rises 
and the UI price starts coming down. Similarly, with shortage the frequency starts falling 
and the UI price rises. The participants in the Pool seeing the rise and fall take corrective 
action that acts as a negative feedback and dampens fluctuations and system reaches equili-
brium. The beauty of the scheme is that the Pool price needs not be calculated. It is totally 
transparent. The mechanism encourages ‘Merit Order Operation’ in a distributed fashion as 
virtually all the generators compete with the prevailing UI price that keeps sliding. 
 
The marked difference in the scheme expects the frequency to fluctuate in order to give a 
signal to the generators to adjust their output. A distributed optimization is effected. The 
mechanism is also akin to Non Co-operative Game Theory through which the best prices are 
achieved. The most interesting feature is that while economy is achieved the mechanism 
also compliments reliability. In UI Mechanism utilities while economically gaining also con-
tribute to reliability. This makes the approach absolutely novel. 
 
Trading of power has been recognized as a separate, distinct licensed activity by the legisla-
tion. There are variety of products being invented by the Traders and the prices are being 
discovered however with a benchmark of prevailing UI prices fixing the virtual roof and 
floor. 
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With the formulation of power pool, settlement system, trading, in 2003 Regulators intro-
duced Open Access in the inter-state transmission. The plan is to progressively introduce 
Open Access for embedded and captive power plants. The Open Access has been primarily 
categorized as ‘long-term’ and ‘short-term’. The detailed speaking orders with elaborate 
procedure has been put in place for calculation of transmission charges, obligation of losses, 
prioritization of allotment, etc. 
 
The transmission development management is a coordinated activity and by and large there 
is not much of intra-regional congestion. However with increase in inter-regional flows con-
gestion has started surfacing in the inter-regional links. Regulators have devised bidding 
procedure to take care of the congestion. Augmentation of Inter-Regional links capacity to 
30,000 MW is envisaged by 2012. 
 
9.1.3 Power Exchange 
At present there is no formal ’Power Exchange’ operating in India. However, the Buyers, 
Sellers and the Traders meet periodically in the various coordination meetings and deals are 
negotiated. Some of the constituents have also opted for tendering and bidding for power 
procurement through Traders in a competitive way. With continuous oversight by the Regu-
lators the resource scheduling and turnover of power by trading is improving and causing 
economy to the sector while giving much desired choice to the utilities. 
 
Basically the concept of a Power Exchange is that of a platform that enables market partici-
pants to go about their business of bidding, pricing, scheduling and settlement of transac-
tions on a real-time basis. In the Indian context, Power Trading Corporation (PTC) of India, 
formed in the year 1999 in the public sector, was initially conceived as an intermediary with 
a primary focus on managing credit risk for the Mega Power Projects. However soon it rec-
ognized its larger mandate of creating a vibrant power market. The concept of an exchange 
gets subsumed in this mandate, and it came up with the statement of purpose as to be a 
frontrunner in developing a Power Market and striving to correct market distortions. 
 
The frontrunner has conceived a roadmap for setting up a power exchange in the country. 
While shaping the concept, the frontrunner has the onus of visualizing the phasing of vari-
ous activities and corresponding investments as also educating various market participants, 
existing and prospective, about the potential benefits. All this has to be dovetailed to the 
Indian context, with its own peculiarities and consequent capacity to absorb change.  
 
With the initiative taken for the first time in 2001, few market participants took part utilizing 
the concept of exchanging surplus power with entities that have complementary deficits at a 
market determined rate. The structure of these transactions was simple, with seller entities 
supplying power on a round-the-clock basis for periods varying from a few months to one 
year to buyer entities. While seller entities benefited by the enhancement of cash flows due 
to better capacity utilization, the buyers got reliable supply at an economic, market-
determined rate. At the same time, various linking entities in the supply chain like the CTU, 
STUs, RLDCs and SLDCs were able to make adjustments in their processes to allow these 
market determined exchange transactions to overlay existing long-term, bilateral transac-
tions. The participants experienced the benefits of exploiting complementary surplus-deficit 
situations arising from an annual or seasonal time-epoch. 
 
As market participants and the linking agencies gained confidence from the demonstration 
of success in these early transactions, more participants were initiated into the market. At 
the same time, the experience curve benefits started accruing to the participants and their 
power planning and operational processes became geared to take on shorter response time. 
At this stage, it was felt that the time was ripe to initiate services that exploited complemen-
tary demand-supply situations arising from shorter time-epochs, like even a one-day period. 
Therefore in 2002, new products were introduced that allowed flow of power for limited 
hours during a 24-hour period, like `Morning Peak’, `Evening Peak’, `Off-Peak’ and various 
combinations like `18 Hours Supply’. As all participants benefited by utilizing these trading 
opportunities for shorter durations, many participants experienced the unique position of 
reversing roles from buyer to seller during the same 24-hour period. At the same time, im-
plementation of Availability Based Tariff was started with the Western Region (WR), and 
PTC as Trader looked at opportunities arising from this situation. Therefore, ‘ABT’ Power 
arising from the need of the utilities in WR to balance schedules and optimize their revenues 
was sold to utilities in the Southern Region (SR) at a fixed rate (the regime in SR had until 
then not changed to ABT). This transaction, though small in terms of the volume traded, 
was a pre-cursor to `As-and-When-Available’ power, a product evolved later in 2003 when 
all participants became subject to the ABT regime. During 2002, with the acquisition of long-
term contracts for trading of power from Chukha and Kurichhu projects in Bhutan it has 
been possible to diversify the supply portfolio. The participants’ confidence in the evolving 
market mechanism is perhaps best symbolized by the structuring of trading transactions for 
the sale of power from the 86 MW Malana HEP for periods ranging from one to three years, 
in effect making it the first plant in India to operate on the merchant power plant business 
model.  
 
In the quest for greater efficiencies through a market based exchange mechanism, the ‘As-
and-When-Available’ power as a product where sale and purchase is planned on a day-
ahead basis in 2003 was introduced. At the same time, the Electricity Act was instituted, and 
it formalized a very important principle on which these transactions were structured, name-
ly `Open Access’ in transmission. Participants and transactions grew manifold, and about 30 
participants were active in the market at any point of time during the year. Several transac-
tions that involved use of transmission systems of four, and even all five-power regions of 
the country were structured successfully. Hence, new participants that came into the market 
were unique in their position. Some of them did not have significant sizes, but were in a 
position to relieve power system congestions, or help other participants in managing re-
sources better because of the timing of the trading opportunities offered. 
 
The challenge in moving ahead to the long-term scenario of an exchange is to reduce the 
response time from a `day-ahead’ level to a real-time environment. While, even in the 
present scenario, it has been possible to effect transactions in periods as low as 6 hours from 
the user’s request, a power exchange aims to reduces this window to the minimum time 
required by the System Operator. This part of the journey, possibly, presents the greatest 
challenge in terms of integrating the evolution process to an exchange-like platform to the 
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in effect making it the first plant in India to operate on the merchant power plant business 
model.  
 
In the quest for greater efficiencies through a market based exchange mechanism, the ‘As-
and-When-Available’ power as a product where sale and purchase is planned on a day-
ahead basis in 2003 was introduced. At the same time, the Electricity Act was instituted, and 
it formalized a very important principle on which these transactions were structured, name-
ly `Open Access’ in transmission. Participants and transactions grew manifold, and about 30 
participants were active in the market at any point of time during the year. Several transac-
tions that involved use of transmission systems of four, and even all five-power regions of 
the country were structured successfully. Hence, new participants that came into the market 
were unique in their position. Some of them did not have significant sizes, but were in a 
position to relieve power system congestions, or help other participants in managing re-
sources better because of the timing of the trading opportunities offered. 
 
The challenge in moving ahead to the long-term scenario of an exchange is to reduce the 
response time from a `day-ahead’ level to a real-time environment. While, even in the 
present scenario, it has been possible to effect transactions in periods as low as 6 hours from 
the user’s request, a power exchange aims to reduces this window to the minimum time 
required by the System Operator. This part of the journey, possibly, presents the greatest 
challenge in terms of integrating the evolution process to an exchange-like platform to the 
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changes taking place in the industry, post Electricity Act 2003. In order to meet this chal-
lenge a number of steps are contemplated that cover various aspects of the development of 
an exchange. 
 
A successful exchange platform requires rewards for efficient operation to be accruing to 
participants equitably. This in turn, depends on the number and type of participants in the 
market. Efforts are being made for a further diversification of the market participants’ base. 
As a result entry of prospective participants, like, Captive Generators, Co-generators, Indus-
try Associations, energy intensive process industries, is expected into the market as Open 
Access customers. However, with all these there may be requirement of change in regulato-
ry structures that would promote development of a market as well as wider participation in 
the market. This is a crucial component in the strategy towards implementation of an ex-
change.  
 
The backbone of an exchange is an information repository. While all other components 
would require investment of time and buy-in of participants and linking entities, this is the 
key component that also requires a significant capital investment. The features of this in-
formation platform would include a single application that allows tracking of bid-to-bill 
(B2B) aspects of all transactions, enables validation at transaction and business levels, sup-
ports high volumes (typical range 500 to 5000 transactions in a year). The applications also 
have to be flexible in that they need to adapt to additional / specific markets. While initially 
the trading platform is envisaged more in the form of bulletin boards or an effective B2B 
platform, the same will evolve into a power exchange with real-time capabilities over a 
longer term. This is the correct approach to setting up a power exchange, as presently all the 
participants do not have online connectivity with even aggregate level scheduling and dis-
patch data available with the RLDCs.  
 
Further to enable customers to adapt to an online environment in a phased manner, as a 
next step it is also necessary to initiate a Customer Relationship Management tool that 
would enable both availability of information at the market participants’ desktops as well as 
allow capture of operational information. As the market matures, this would evolve into a 
B2B platform, or alternatively, integrate with an existing B2B platform. In fact the B2B plat-
form would be a pre-cursor to a fully functional, real-time exchange.  
 
Thus, with lot of changes taking place in the Indian power scenario, due to unbundling of 
generation, transmission and distribution and subsequent regulation providing Open 
Access of transmission, de facto Power Exchange is in place in grid operation. Scheduling of 
generation with Open Access of transmission system to meet demand is done keeping in 
mind trading of power involved on short-term and long-term basis. Under real time Grid 
Operation, system operates with the principle of Availability Based Tariff taking care of Un-
scheduled Interchange, of course subject to the constraint of system security and stability. 
 
9.2 The Influence of Transmission on Further Development of  
Power Exchange in the Australian National Electricity Market  
The national electricity market (NEM) is the market for the wholesale supply and purchase 
of electricity in five Australian states and territories - the Australian Capital Territory, New 
South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria - together with a regime of open 
access to the transmission and distribution networks in those states and territories5. Tasma-
nia intends joining the market following completion of Basslink.  
 
The market was launched on 13 December 1998. 
The objectives of the national electricity market are that: 
 
● the market should be competitive;  
● customers should be able to choose which supplier (including generators and retailers) 
they will trade with;  
● any person wishing to do so should be able to gain access to the interconnected trans-
mission and distribution network;  
● a person wishing to enter the market should not be treated more favorably or less fa-
vorably than if that person was already participating in the market;  
● a particular energy source or technology should not be treated more favorably or less 
favorably than another energy source or technology; and  
● the provisions regulating trading of electricity in the market should not treat intrastate 
trading more favorably or less favorably than interstate trading of electricity.  
 
9.2.1 Description 
The NEM is based on a single dispatch model. Generators are dispatched every five minutes 
on the basis of bid price in $/MWh. An ancillary services market also operates 
simultaneously with the energy market to maintain the level of operating reserve. 
 
The NEM spans more than 4000km. The long distance transmission between load and 
generation centers can require restricting the dispatch of generators to avoid overloading 
transmission. Presently, the NEM is divided into several pricing regions. The market can 
thus be described as a limited nodal pricing model. The resulting dispatch rules 
accommodate the effects of marginal inter-regional loss factors and inter-regional operating 
limits. The control center dispatch software, based on a Linear Programming algorithm, 
minimizes the cost of meeting the load subject to many variables including generator upper 
and lower operating limits, inter-regional line limits, and minimum reserve levels.  
 
The inter-regional transmission system has been augmented several times since market 
inception, including connection of Queensland in 2000 through the Direct link dc link and 
the QNI ac link, then in 2002 with the Murray link dc interconnector between Victoria and 
South Australia. In November 2005, the Tasmanian and Victorian systems was 
interconnected for the first time by a 300km undersea HVdc cable.  
 
Figure 9.1 shows the connection arrangement including the nominal interconnector 
limitations between regions. 
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Figure 9.1. Generation and transfer capabilities (Summer 2004/05). 
 
9.2.2 Issues 
 
9.2.2.1 Generation utilization 
Prior to and since market inception, the forced outage rates of generating plant have re-
duced substantially. This has allowed the margin between supply and demand to reduce 
without compromising reliability. The result of these efficiency gains has been to increase 
the dependence of reliable market operation on inter-regional interconnections. 
 
The general reduction in the gap between annual installed capacity and annual half hourly 
peak demand over time is shown in Figure 9.2. While net generation of nearly 4000MW has 
been added since the start of the NEM due to market forces, the summer peak demand has 
increased by more than 6000MW. The data is for the mainland states only, but includes a net 
injection of equivalent generating capacity of 600MW from Bass link starting in 2005-06. 
 
9.2.2.2 Resource Development 
Growth, with accompanying pool price increases, is the main driver for the development of 
new generation. 
 
At the same time, environmental factors are influencing the development of the market 
through restrictions on permitting plants that do not meet the highest levels of performance 
available for that fuel. 
 
Several mechanisms are in place to encourage development of renewable or low emission 
generation within a market context: 
 
- Commonwealth initiatives such as the 2% Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) 
scheme for additional renewable energy 
- State initiatives such as the Queensland 13% gas scheme and the NSW Greenhouse Ab-
atement Certificate (NGAC) scheme, both of which are aimed at enhancing efficiency, 
and development of lower emission plant such as gas. 
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With the impending exhaustion of opportunities to gain further performance improvements 
from existing generation, many new plans are being developed by market participants to 
introduce new generation, predominantly gas, black coal, brown coal, wind and biomass. 
Wind resources dominate in the southern regions, while biomass tends to dominate in the 
northern regions. 
 
Major gas pipelines are planned from Papua New Guinea and the Timor Sea, both north of 
Australia. If these projects eventuate they are of the scale to introduce major changes to the 
generation mix and utilization of transmission.  
 
The Bass link project will add 2500MW of storage hydro generation to the existing mainland 
hydro (predominantly the 3676MW Snowy Mountains hydro), and introduce further dy-
namics to the hydrothermal interactions. 
 
 
9.2.2.3 Transmission utilization 
Flows are significantly different from the pre-market situation. While pre-NEM flows were 
dominated by issues within state boundaries, plus defined interchanges based on operating 
agreements, the market has expanded trading across interconnectors on the basis of bids by 
all generation including renewables. 
 
This has tended to use transmission to a higher degree, resulting in increased incidence of 
operation at or near transmission limits. 
 
The increasing incidence of transmission constraints resulting in price separation between 
regions with generation constrained off or down in the exporting region(s) has created the 
opportunity for further augmentation. However, since transmission is a regulated service, 
additional transmission augmentation has to be justified on the basis of reliability or cost 
reductions. Proposals are in place, however, to relax the conditions for regulated 
augmentations by accounting for other defined market benefits. This could open the way for 
expanded interconnections and/or new interconnections between existing regions. 
 
Unregulated transmission can be built by a proponent seeking to recover its investment 
based on market revenues. So far, several such transmission links have been built, all based 
on HVdc technology and connecting regions with potential price differentials sufficient to 
justify the investments. One of these, Murray link, has since successfully applied for 
conversion to regulated status. 
 
The potential for additional transmission connections to other regions and/or countries is 
reduced by the relatively small loads and long distances involved. The largest unconnected 
region is the 4000MW South West Interconnected System (SWIS) in Western Australia, 
which is approximately 2000km from the nearest connection point to the NEM. Since 
Western Australia has an abundance of energy available from the North West Shelf gas 
fields in the north of the state, and coal fields in the South West, there is no economic 
justification for a NEM-SWIS link at present. 
 
Several smaller grids are operating in Australia - in North West Western Australia (the 
North West Interconnected System, of about 400MW, and several other unconnected 
generators with an additional several hundred MW), in the Northern Territory 
(approximately 400MW), and in North West Queensland (approximately 400MW). These 
may be linked to the NEM or to each other as part of anticipated resource developments, 
including gas pipelines from the Timor Sea and/or PNG.  
 
9.2.3 Market Developments 
The strict conditions associated with development of the NEM have resulted in a robust and 
successful electricity market. This market has succeeded in accommodating substantial load 
growth, while accommodating several thousand MW of new merchant plant of various 
types and sizes. There has also been withdrawal of some generation due to market forces. 
The success of the NEM can be put down to several factors, including:  
 
 A single body/organization overseeing the market 
 Multiple parties looking at system operation to look after commercial interests 
 Careful specification and description of network limitations, resulting in a general 
increase in network utilization. 
 expanded tools to improve analysis, which are used by market operators, partici-
pants and regulatory authorities. 
 A uniformity of approach in the application of standards for connection and access, 
which previously did not exist. 
 Transparency and governance strictly according to the National Electricity Code 
and National Electricity Law. High levels of transparency tend to ensure good go-
vernance. 
 Active involvement at the political level as well as the industry level 
 The high quality of staff in market operation 
 The high level of horizontal and vertical disaggregation of the industry exposes the 
risks of markets and therefore drives commerciality. This tends to drive out the 
benefits in each part of the industry. 
 The rules and regulations support and facilitate market operation. 
 
9.2.4 The Way Forward 
Since market inception, grid development has been minimal compared with the extensive 
changes to the operating regimes of existing generating plant and the new generating plant 
that has been developed. 
 
This has resulted in increasing tension between regulated grid development and generation. 
 
Planning and implementation of changes to the grid have been underway in several critical 
areas.  
 
Grid companies will need sufficient incentives to consider augmentation to meet the 
imperatives of economic resource development in an environment that is likely to include 
further and stricter emissions limitations from generation sources. 
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which previously did not exist. 
 Transparency and governance strictly according to the National Electricity Code 
and National Electricity Law. High levels of transparency tend to ensure good go-
vernance. 
 Active involvement at the political level as well as the industry level 
 The high quality of staff in market operation 
 The high level of horizontal and vertical disaggregation of the industry exposes the 
risks of markets and therefore drives commerciality. This tends to drive out the 
benefits in each part of the industry. 
 The rules and regulations support and facilitate market operation. 
 
9.2.4 The Way Forward 
Since market inception, grid development has been minimal compared with the extensive 
changes to the operating regimes of existing generating plant and the new generating plant 
that has been developed. 
 
This has resulted in increasing tension between regulated grid development and generation. 
 
Planning and implementation of changes to the grid have been underway in several critical 
areas.  
 
Grid companies will need sufficient incentives to consider augmentation to meet the 
imperatives of economic resource development in an environment that is likely to include 
further and stricter emissions limitations from generation sources. 
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9.3 Technical and Market System Effectiveness of Intersystem  
Power Exchanges in Russia  
Historically the formation of large electric power systems and their interconnection into the 
Unified power system (UPS) of the country was related to the objective positive factors. Crea-
tion of Russia’s UPS enhanced essentially the economic efficiency and reliability of power 
supply as compared to separately operating regional power systems. The influence of the sys-
tem effect casts no doubt among energy specialists. A great number of publications have been 
dedicated to the analysis of different aspects of system efficiency of electric power systems. 
 
This section deals with the notions of the potential effect of integration of electric power 
systems (EPS) and the effect realized in a market environment. The estimation technique is 
presented. The effect is estimated on the example of Russia’s UPS.  
 
9.3.1 Technical System Effect 
The system effect in electric power industry is of a multi-factor character. Traditionally the 
following technology-based components of the intersystem effect have been set off at inte-
gration of power systems6, 7. 
 
A “capacity” effect 
● A decrease in demand for installed capacity of power plants by bringing into coincidence 
the load maxim, reducing the operating reserve, decreasing the reserves for routine main-
tenance; 
● An increase in firm power of hydro power plants by raising the total firm power owing to 
asynchronous run off in different river basins and use of long-term regulation of water 
reservoirs to the benefits of neighboring power systems; 
● A more complete use of commissioned capacity by decreasing the unused capacity in a 
large system. 
 
A “structural “effect: 
● Rationalization of power system structure by: using cheap (but economically inefficient in 
terms of transportation) energy resources at power plants with power transmission to 
neighboring systems; increasing the use of peak and free power of hydro power plants; 
● A better use of hydropower in the high water years; 
● An opportunity to construct power plants successively with the use of temporary surplus 
powers in the other power plants; 
● Saving in the construction of electric networks for power supply to the areas of individual 
power systems connection.  
 
A “frequency” effect 
A Frequency Effect implies a lesser impact of an individual energy unit or a consumer in a 
large electric power system (EPS) on the system frequency as compared to a smaller system. 
The frequency effect allows the unit capacity of energy facilities to be chosen without con-
straints on the system requirements. 
 
 
 
An “operation” effect  
An Operation Effect implies a decrease in operating costs by optimizing the operating con-
ditions of power plants in the integrated system, increasing the total density of load curves 
of power systems at integration, by widely using the cheap fuels. 
 
An “environmental” effect supposes improvement of the environmental situation due to 
redistribution of power generation at power plants with its decrease in the areas with unfa-
vorable environmental conditions. 
All these components have objective material (technological) nature. However currently the 
assessment of these components only seems to be insufficient. 
 
9.3.2 Market System Effect 
At present the process of operation and expansion of power systems involves many subjects 
of relations in electric power industry: power companies, individual power plants, Govern-
mental authorities (federal and regional), electricity consumers (production and agricultural 
consumers, transport sector and population). These subjects have different interests. For 
power companies as for the wholesale market subjects the main criterion is profit. The crite-
ria of the governmental authorities include profitability of the sector (incomes to the budg-
ets), impact of the electric power industry on the industrial production volumes, employ-
ment and living conditions of the population, environmental impact, energy security, etc. 
The consumers are interested in the level of electricity and heat tariffs, reliability and quality 
of power supply. In particular the decisions efficient from the viewpoint of a federal or “na-
tional economic” level can be unacceptable for the other subjects. Many decisions cannot be 
made until the interests of all the parties concerned are coordinated and the required com-
promise is achieved.  
 
Thus, the traditional estimation of power systems efficiency with account for only 
technological factors corresponds currently only to its technically feasible limits. Let us call 
them technical system effects (TSE).  
 
The fact that many subjects have different interests and affect the decision making on 
expansion and operation of power systems does not change the set of components of the 
effect but leads to variations in the set for different subjects of relations and to different 
estimations of the same components of the effect by different subjects of relations.  
 
Consider the main factors that determine the system effects for different subjects of relations 
in a market environment (let us call them market system effects (MSE)) as applied to 
Russia’s current electric power industry structure that consists of competing generating and 
selling companies, network companies as natural monopolies, electricity consumers. 
 
The bids of generating companies for electricity supply to the wholesale markets build the 
function of a supply which is then related to the function of a demand for electricity on the 
part of selling companies and consumers. This relationship is used to determine the 
equilibrium price of electricity at the wholesale market. Profit, being the main criterion for 
the generating companies under competition will make them decrease the costs of electricity 
production by loading, first of all, the most efficient generating capacities. Thus, the market 
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mechanisms will decrease the equilibrium electricity price at the wholesale market. This is 
possible at joint operation of generating companies in a system with no network constraints. 
Here the account should be taken of the constraints on participation of generating units in 
covering load curves and on provision of power supply reliability and power quality. 
 
The relationship between the MSE and the above TSE components shows that the formation 
of equilibrium electricity price at the wholesale market involves realization of practically all 
the TSE components. However the extent of their realization is determined by the efficiency 
of the competing market mechanisms. Bearing in mind the fact that the ideal competition in 
electric power industry is practically unachievable due to a limited number of market 
subjects we can expect that the MSE will be smaller than the potential TSE. 
 
Similar market mechanisms should operate at competition of selling companies at the 
consumer electricity markets that will result in realization of additional MSE components at 
this level. 
 
Network companies (federal and distribution regional) play an auxiliary role in the 
considered market processes. They rend the required services on power transmission from 
suppliers to consumers, on provision of power supply reliability and power quality, thus 
being conducive to the enhancement of MSE as a result of electricity market operation. 
 
It is necessary to emphasize that in a short-term context the competing mechanisms at the 
wholesale and consumer electricity markets may decrease the electricity prices even below 
the level which is determined by the complete realization of TSE, as a result of price bids of 
the generating companies below the electricity production cost with account for its 
components. However, in a long-term context this situation is fraught with negative 
consequences that may take the form of inadmissible reduction of reserve capacities, 
decrease in funds to maintain the equipment in service state, to update and replace it. This 
will result in disappearance of conditions for competition at the electricity markets. The 
trend may appear toward a sharp increase in the electricity prices that will call for their 
regulation. 
 
The interests of consumers expressed through their main criteria imply the interest in 
efficient operation of the electricity markets, i.e. maximum realization of MSE and, thus 
decrease in the electricity prices.  
 
The interests of the authorities are to a certain extent contradictory. For example, the electric 
power industry will be highly profitable at high profits of power companies and these high 
profits are possible at high electricity prices. At the same time the efficiency of the industrial 
production, the living conditions of the population and other interests call for decrease in 
these prices. However, on the whole the authorities are certainly interested in the efficient 
operation of electricity markets, i.e. in maximum MSE realization.  
 
It should be noted that for the subjects of relations the real effect from the measures on 
intensification of power systems integration depends on the system of economic 
management in the country. The system of management to a considerable extent affects the 
redistribution of the real effect among the subjects of relations and can both foster and 
hinder the TSE realization. 
 
9.3.3 Principles of Estimating the System Efficiency 
When estimating the potential TSE we consider UPS of Russia as a technically and 
technologically single object disregarding the forms of property. In this context this 
estimation is objective and single-valued. Comparatively simply we determine the base for 
such estimation, i.e. the conditions the effect is estimated for. Here we should use the 
approaches and recommendations that were developed for the centrally managed electric 
power industry. In a certain sense the model of the centrally managed electric power 
industry facilitates the full realization of the potential TSE. 
 
The TSE components for UPS as a whole were estimated, depending on the aspect of 
consideration, based either on the conditions that do not suppose realization of the effect 
(for example isolated operation of regional power systems) or on the existing level of the 
UPS integration. 
 
The approaches to the estimation of MSE are less obvious. When analyzing UPS expansion 
for a long-term future they apparently should be maximum independent from the 
conditions and principles of legal-normative framework. We should orient to the situation 
when the legal-normative framework fosters the full realization of TSE. When considering 
short-term prospects it is necessary to take into account the active legal-normative 
framework. 
 
For a qualitative estimation of the system effect it is necessary to use existing and develop 
new mathematical models for: estimation of individual TSE components; integral estimation 
of an effect (such models are necessary as the net present value is not a simple sum of 
individual components); estimation of effects for federal and regional authorities and energy 
consumers that include the assessment of budget efficiency, levels of electricity tariffs, level 
of employment, level of living conditions, etc. 
 
A complex integral estimation of the TSE involves the optimization model of electric power 
system expansion “SOYUZ”8-10.  
 
9.3.4 Case Study 
Below presented are the results of estimating the system efficiency of Russia’s UPS 
expansion for the time horizon 2010-2030. 
 
It is very complicated to fully estimate all the TSE components, therefore only the main ones 
were estimated: the “capacity” effect, excluding the effects of equipment maintenance 
optimization and use of asynchronous run off in the rivers of different water reservoirs; the 
“structural” effect disregarding the environmental components, the effect of successive 
construction and construction of transmission lines at the point of connection of adjacent 
power systems; the “operation” and “frequency” effects. The model “SOYUZ” was applied 
for the estimation.  
www.intechopen.com
Status of Power Markets and Power Exchanges in Asia and Australia 343
mechanisms will decrease the equilibrium electricity price at the wholesale market. This is 
possible at joint operation of generating companies in a system with no network constraints. 
Here the account should be taken of the constraints on participation of generating units in 
covering load curves and on provision of power supply reliability and power quality. 
 
The relationship between the MSE and the above TSE components shows that the formation 
of equilibrium electricity price at the wholesale market involves realization of practically all 
the TSE components. However the extent of their realization is determined by the efficiency 
of the competing market mechanisms. Bearing in mind the fact that the ideal competition in 
electric power industry is practically unachievable due to a limited number of market 
subjects we can expect that the MSE will be smaller than the potential TSE. 
 
Similar market mechanisms should operate at competition of selling companies at the 
consumer electricity markets that will result in realization of additional MSE components at 
this level. 
 
Network companies (federal and distribution regional) play an auxiliary role in the 
considered market processes. They rend the required services on power transmission from 
suppliers to consumers, on provision of power supply reliability and power quality, thus 
being conducive to the enhancement of MSE as a result of electricity market operation. 
 
It is necessary to emphasize that in a short-term context the competing mechanisms at the 
wholesale and consumer electricity markets may decrease the electricity prices even below 
the level which is determined by the complete realization of TSE, as a result of price bids of 
the generating companies below the electricity production cost with account for its 
components. However, in a long-term context this situation is fraught with negative 
consequences that may take the form of inadmissible reduction of reserve capacities, 
decrease in funds to maintain the equipment in service state, to update and replace it. This 
will result in disappearance of conditions for competition at the electricity markets. The 
trend may appear toward a sharp increase in the electricity prices that will call for their 
regulation. 
 
The interests of consumers expressed through their main criteria imply the interest in 
efficient operation of the electricity markets, i.e. maximum realization of MSE and, thus 
decrease in the electricity prices.  
 
The interests of the authorities are to a certain extent contradictory. For example, the electric 
power industry will be highly profitable at high profits of power companies and these high 
profits are possible at high electricity prices. At the same time the efficiency of the industrial 
production, the living conditions of the population and other interests call for decrease in 
these prices. However, on the whole the authorities are certainly interested in the efficient 
operation of electricity markets, i.e. in maximum MSE realization.  
 
It should be noted that for the subjects of relations the real effect from the measures on 
intensification of power systems integration depends on the system of economic 
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hinder the TSE realization. 
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When estimating the potential TSE we consider UPS of Russia as a technically and 
technologically single object disregarding the forms of property. In this context this 
estimation is objective and single-valued. Comparatively simply we determine the base for 
such estimation, i.e. the conditions the effect is estimated for. Here we should use the 
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In the analysis of MSE the changes in EPS profit, cost of electricity produced, customer 
profits, payments to the federal and regional budgets were evaluated from the standpoint of 
subjects of the wholesale market, authorities and customers. 
 
Comparison was made by the variant that envisaged expansion of the UPS generating 
capacities without expansion of the intersystem electric network, whose transfer capabilities 
between interconnected EPSs (IPSs) remained at the existing level. The basic variant to be 
estimated was the variant of the UPS expansion that was recommended by design 
institutions with optimization of transfer capabilities of tie lines between IPSs. 
 
UPS in the model was described by a 7-node network (by IPSs). Two time levels were 
modeled: the years 2010 and 2030.  
 
Adaptation of the structure of generating capacities to different expansion conditions was 
foreseen by the necessary changes in capacity commissioning at condensing power plants. 
The main calculation results are presented in Table 9.1. 
 
The Table shows that the expansion of intersystem tie lines over the time span to 2010 is 
effective. The discounted costs for the UPS operation and expansion in this variant are $340 
million lower than in the variant without their expansion, the required installed capacity of 
power plants is 990 MW lower, the saving of investments makes up $1.8 billion, the annual 
expenditures decrease by $110 million per year.  
 
 
Indices, million doll. 
Efficiency 
2010  2030  
Discounted costs, total 
 Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
340 
440 
-110 
2760 
3080 
-320 
Capital investments, total 
 Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
1810 
2510 
-700 
12890 
14720 
-1830 
Installed capacity, MW 990 8740 
Annual expenses 
Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
110 
130 
-20 
1220 
1320 
-100 
Fuel costs -50 -30 
Payments to the budget 49 510 
Net profit of power companies 88 900 
Cost of electricity production 130 1320 
Table 9.1 Basic components of the efficiency of UPS integration 
 
Expansion of the intersystem tie lines “Siberia – Ural” and “North-West - Center” is the 
most effective. The effect of expansion of the intersystem tie lines depends primarily on the 
“capacity” components when connecting the IPS of Siberia due to coincidence of load 
maxim and power exchanges of IPSs in emergency situations; capacity commissioning at 
power plants in Siberia decreases with partial compensation for this decrease by the 
capacity commissioned in other systems and increased use of existing power plants. 
 
Decrease of operating costs is determined mainly by the decrease in fixed costs as a result of 
decrease in the total installed capacity; the fuel costs even somewhat increase due to the 
change in the structure of fuel burnt. Decrease in the cost of electricity production is 
accompanied by the growing profit of power supply systems and growing payments to the 
budgets of different levels. 
 
The calculated value of the effect over the time horizon to 2030 (see Table 1) is considerably 
higher (3-4 times) than to 2010. The effect value is much higher than the expenses for its 
realization by construction and maintenance of intersystem tie lines. One dollar invested in 
expansion of transmission lines saves $2.5. The relation between decrease in discounted 
costs and increase in costs for transmission lines is equal to 3.1. One dollar invested in 
expansion of transmission lines decreases the cost of electricity production by 19 cent, 
increases an annual profit in UPS by 12 cents, and brings 7 cents to the annual consolidated 
budget. 
 
Thus, the studies performed confirm a high efficiency of measures on strengthening the 
integration of Russia’s UPS. The estimates obtained are conservative enough, since they 
cover not all the components of the system effect. In particular, the possibilities for 
formation of UPS expansion conditions that are optimal in terms of gaining the highest 
system effect were not analyzed. The system effect within IPSs in terms of interaction 
between the power systems comprising it was not considered as well. Account for this 
internal effect can raise the obtained estimates by a factor of 1.5-2.0. Nonetheless, even such 
conservative estimates point to an absolute efficiency of EPS integration. It can be achieved 
by the proper implementation of the required principles of economic management and the 
provisions of the legal-normative-legal framework. 
 
9.4 Deregulation of power systems in Asia: special  
considerations in developing countries 
Power industry is undergoing restructuring throughout the world11-17. The traditional verti-
cally monopolistic structure has been deregulated and replaced by gencos, transcos and 
discos with competitions introduced to gencos and discos in order to reach higher efficiency 
in electricity production and utilization. A lot of R&D work has been conducted on power 
markets18-24. However for different countries, the principal objectives and considerations of 
power system deregulation are different. In the developed countries, areas with higher elec-
tricity prices would like to introduce competitions so that electricity prices are able to reduce 
and social welfare can be maximized. In some countries, electric power supply sector is a 
regulated public utility, and the government would like to privatize the electric power in-
dustry so as to reduce government commitment and functions. In this regard, gencos, tran-
scos and discos are formed with competition introduced to gencos and discos to stimulate 
www.intechopen.com
Status of Power Markets and Power Exchanges in Asia and Australia 345
In the analysis of MSE the changes in EPS profit, cost of electricity produced, customer 
profits, payments to the federal and regional budgets were evaluated from the standpoint of 
subjects of the wholesale market, authorities and customers. 
 
Comparison was made by the variant that envisaged expansion of the UPS generating 
capacities without expansion of the intersystem electric network, whose transfer capabilities 
between interconnected EPSs (IPSs) remained at the existing level. The basic variant to be 
estimated was the variant of the UPS expansion that was recommended by design 
institutions with optimization of transfer capabilities of tie lines between IPSs. 
 
UPS in the model was described by a 7-node network (by IPSs). Two time levels were 
modeled: the years 2010 and 2030.  
 
Adaptation of the structure of generating capacities to different expansion conditions was 
foreseen by the necessary changes in capacity commissioning at condensing power plants. 
The main calculation results are presented in Table 9.1. 
 
The Table shows that the expansion of intersystem tie lines over the time span to 2010 is 
effective. The discounted costs for the UPS operation and expansion in this variant are $340 
million lower than in the variant without their expansion, the required installed capacity of 
power plants is 990 MW lower, the saving of investments makes up $1.8 billion, the annual 
expenditures decrease by $110 million per year.  
 
 
Indices, million doll. 
Efficiency 
2010  2030  
Discounted costs, total 
 Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
340 
440 
-110 
2760 
3080 
-320 
Capital investments, total 
 Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
1810 
2510 
-700 
12890 
14720 
-1830 
Installed capacity, MW 990 8740 
Annual expenses 
Including: Power plants 
 Transmission lines 
110 
130 
-20 
1220 
1320 
-100 
Fuel costs -50 -30 
Payments to the budget 49 510 
Net profit of power companies 88 900 
Cost of electricity production 130 1320 
Table 9.1 Basic components of the efficiency of UPS integration 
 
Expansion of the intersystem tie lines “Siberia – Ural” and “North-West - Center” is the 
most effective. The effect of expansion of the intersystem tie lines depends primarily on the 
“capacity” components when connecting the IPS of Siberia due to coincidence of load 
maxim and power exchanges of IPSs in emergency situations; capacity commissioning at 
power plants in Siberia decreases with partial compensation for this decrease by the 
capacity commissioned in other systems and increased use of existing power plants. 
 
Decrease of operating costs is determined mainly by the decrease in fixed costs as a result of 
decrease in the total installed capacity; the fuel costs even somewhat increase due to the 
change in the structure of fuel burnt. Decrease in the cost of electricity production is 
accompanied by the growing profit of power supply systems and growing payments to the 
budgets of different levels. 
 
The calculated value of the effect over the time horizon to 2030 (see Table 1) is considerably 
higher (3-4 times) than to 2010. The effect value is much higher than the expenses for its 
realization by construction and maintenance of intersystem tie lines. One dollar invested in 
expansion of transmission lines saves $2.5. The relation between decrease in discounted 
costs and increase in costs for transmission lines is equal to 3.1. One dollar invested in 
expansion of transmission lines decreases the cost of electricity production by 19 cent, 
increases an annual profit in UPS by 12 cents, and brings 7 cents to the annual consolidated 
budget. 
 
Thus, the studies performed confirm a high efficiency of measures on strengthening the 
integration of Russia’s UPS. The estimates obtained are conservative enough, since they 
cover not all the components of the system effect. In particular, the possibilities for 
formation of UPS expansion conditions that are optimal in terms of gaining the highest 
system effect were not analyzed. The system effect within IPSs in terms of interaction 
between the power systems comprising it was not considered as well. Account for this 
internal effect can raise the obtained estimates by a factor of 1.5-2.0. Nonetheless, even such 
conservative estimates point to an absolute efficiency of EPS integration. It can be achieved 
by the proper implementation of the required principles of economic management and the 
provisions of the legal-normative-legal framework. 
 
9.4 Deregulation of power systems in Asia: special  
considerations in developing countries 
Power industry is undergoing restructuring throughout the world11-17. The traditional verti-
cally monopolistic structure has been deregulated and replaced by gencos, transcos and 
discos with competitions introduced to gencos and discos in order to reach higher efficiency 
in electricity production and utilization. A lot of R&D work has been conducted on power 
markets18-24. However for different countries, the principal objectives and considerations of 
power system deregulation are different. In the developed countries, areas with higher elec-
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dustry so as to reduce government commitment and functions. In this regard, gencos, tran-
scos and discos are formed with competition introduced to gencos and discos to stimulate 
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their incentives in efficiency improvement. When efficiency grows up and electricity price 
goes down, it can in turn promote GDP growth. In the developing countries, the power sys-
tem deregulation and power markets are to establish fair competition among gencos so as to 
encourage investments to power industry from various resources, such as foreign invest-
ments, local investments and IPPs etc.  
 
The diversified resources attracted to power industry can well meet the requirement of fast 
growing electricity demand induced by blooming economy in the developing countries. 
This might be the main reason for Asian developing countries to promote deregulation in 
power systems. 
 
Although power system deregulation is widely conducted in the world, it is not easy to 
successfully reach the initial targets set for the deregulation. Both experiences and lessons 
are obtained in practice. Considering that power industry is a significant infrastructure and 
in order to realize sustainable development of power systems at high efficiency, how to 
realize optimal system planning and reliable operation at acceptable electricity prices with 
qualifies service and how to transit to the market environment smoothly at lowest costs and 
lowest risks should be considered thoroughly in the market environment. This is actually an 
important task for the developing countries in Asia. 
 
9.4.1 Considerations on Power System Deregulation in Developing Countries  
 
9.4.1.1 Targets of deregulation 
In Asian developing countries, power systems are usually owned by the state or provincial 
government before deregulation and operated as a vertical monopoly. Unified dispatch is 
applied to individual power grids with limited power exchange to external grids. Hence the 
interconnections among grids are relatively weak. Because of fast economic development, 
the electricity demand is growing rapidly and the power system expansion becomes a se-
vere economic burden of the governments and a bottleneck of overall economy sustainable 
development. Investments from companies other than governments to power systems 
through approaches such as Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) etc. are not so attractive. It is 
urgent to launch power system restructuring and deregulation and to establish power mar-
kets with fair competition so as to attract more investments from various resources to power 
industry. Moreover it is found that in some countries the monopolistic operation of power 
systems can also lead to low efficiency and even corruption for non-transparency and lack of 
surveillance in operation. It is clear that the power market is able to solve most of the prob-
lems appropriately. 
 
Based on the facts mentioned above, the targets of power system deregulation and power 
market establishment in Asian developing countries can be outlined as follows with certain 
priority. 
 
* To attract various investments to power systems through open-access and fair competi-
tion so that power supply can meet the fast growth of demand in developing countries. 
* To reduce government commitment to power industry, which is a severe burden to the 
governments of developing countries concerning huge amount of investment to the infra-
structure construction; and to mitigate government functions in power industry so that the 
government can focus attention to significant issues of entire society. 
* To encourage efficient electricity production and utilization through competition and 
electricity pricing mechanism. The energy resources can be saved. The production costs can 
be reduced and hopefully the electricity price can decrease. It can in turn increase social wel-
fare and benefit to national GDP growth. Thus sustainable development of power industry 
can be realized. 
* Through competition, the market-clearing price (MCP) of electricity can provide clear 
economic information for future power system development use; power supply services can 
be improved; gencos’ profits may increase through higher operation efficiency; and the gov-
ernment tax return from power industry can be raised.  
 
However the realization of the targets are not easy because power system deregulation 
involves the benefits of various parties and each party will try hard to protect its own 
interests and add influence to the power market policies and rules. To keep a large genco 
can make it possess noticeable market power to get more profits. To define a MCP with or 
without congestion management consideration will lead to totally different profit 
distributions. To organize a small provincial market or a large regional power market may 
bring about significantly different social welfare. In order to construct power markets with 
fairness, justice and transparency, thorough considerations should be made to various 
aspects, which will be discussed below. 
 
9.4.1.2 Considerations on the scheme of power system deregulation 
The overall power market scheme is usually considered by the government. It includes 
several aspects described below. 
 
* According to the targets set for deregulation, it is very important for the government to 
consider carefully at the beginning on: how many markets should be organized throughout 
the country; who should be responsible to organize the power markets, how to organize 
gencos, transcos and discos; what are their functions; who is responsible for market opera-
tion and/or system operation; how to develop market rules; who is responsible for market 
surveillance; how to transit from current regulated market to future competitive market; etc. 
A timetable should also be developed for execution. It is clear that a lot of negotiations and 
government decisions should be made at this level in order to make deregulation process 
successful. International consultant might be helpful, however for the different economic 
and technical backgrounds, it is more important to rely on own conditions and experts to 
make final decision. 
* After the fundamental decisions in launching the deregulation, the market rule devel-
opment is a key step. A lot of lessons have been obtained in this aspect. For developing 
countries, copying power market rules of other countries or other markets such as natural 
gas etc. might lead to severe results. The market rules should be different from market to 
market with only principles unchanged. Therefore all market participants (suppliers, con-
sumers, brokers, operators etc.) should have rights to join or examine rule development with 
consideration on all economic, technical and physical backgrounds, conditions and trends. 
The rule should try to be a perfect set on market organization, market functions, goods to be 
exchanged and services to be provided, sub-markets definition (futures, forward, option, 
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their incentives in efficiency improvement. When efficiency grows up and electricity price 
goes down, it can in turn promote GDP growth. In the developing countries, the power sys-
tem deregulation and power markets are to establish fair competition among gencos so as to 
encourage investments to power industry from various resources, such as foreign invest-
ments, local investments and IPPs etc.  
 
The diversified resources attracted to power industry can well meet the requirement of fast 
growing electricity demand induced by blooming economy in the developing countries. 
This might be the main reason for Asian developing countries to promote deregulation in 
power systems. 
 
Although power system deregulation is widely conducted in the world, it is not easy to 
successfully reach the initial targets set for the deregulation. Both experiences and lessons 
are obtained in practice. Considering that power industry is a significant infrastructure and 
in order to realize sustainable development of power systems at high efficiency, how to 
realize optimal system planning and reliable operation at acceptable electricity prices with 
qualifies service and how to transit to the market environment smoothly at lowest costs and 
lowest risks should be considered thoroughly in the market environment. This is actually an 
important task for the developing countries in Asia. 
 
9.4.1 Considerations on Power System Deregulation in Developing Countries  
 
9.4.1.1 Targets of deregulation 
In Asian developing countries, power systems are usually owned by the state or provincial 
government before deregulation and operated as a vertical monopoly. Unified dispatch is 
applied to individual power grids with limited power exchange to external grids. Hence the 
interconnections among grids are relatively weak. Because of fast economic development, 
the electricity demand is growing rapidly and the power system expansion becomes a se-
vere economic burden of the governments and a bottleneck of overall economy sustainable 
development. Investments from companies other than governments to power systems 
through approaches such as Build-Operation-Transfer (BOT) etc. are not so attractive. It is 
urgent to launch power system restructuring and deregulation and to establish power mar-
kets with fair competition so as to attract more investments from various resources to power 
industry. Moreover it is found that in some countries the monopolistic operation of power 
systems can also lead to low efficiency and even corruption for non-transparency and lack of 
surveillance in operation. It is clear that the power market is able to solve most of the prob-
lems appropriately. 
 
Based on the facts mentioned above, the targets of power system deregulation and power 
market establishment in Asian developing countries can be outlined as follows with certain 
priority. 
 
* To attract various investments to power systems through open-access and fair competi-
tion so that power supply can meet the fast growth of demand in developing countries. 
* To reduce government commitment to power industry, which is a severe burden to the 
governments of developing countries concerning huge amount of investment to the infra-
structure construction; and to mitigate government functions in power industry so that the 
government can focus attention to significant issues of entire society. 
* To encourage efficient electricity production and utilization through competition and 
electricity pricing mechanism. The energy resources can be saved. The production costs can 
be reduced and hopefully the electricity price can decrease. It can in turn increase social wel-
fare and benefit to national GDP growth. Thus sustainable development of power industry 
can be realized. 
* Through competition, the market-clearing price (MCP) of electricity can provide clear 
economic information for future power system development use; power supply services can 
be improved; gencos’ profits may increase through higher operation efficiency; and the gov-
ernment tax return from power industry can be raised.  
 
However the realization of the targets are not easy because power system deregulation 
involves the benefits of various parties and each party will try hard to protect its own 
interests and add influence to the power market policies and rules. To keep a large genco 
can make it possess noticeable market power to get more profits. To define a MCP with or 
without congestion management consideration will lead to totally different profit 
distributions. To organize a small provincial market or a large regional power market may 
bring about significantly different social welfare. In order to construct power markets with 
fairness, justice and transparency, thorough considerations should be made to various 
aspects, which will be discussed below. 
 
9.4.1.2 Considerations on the scheme of power system deregulation 
The overall power market scheme is usually considered by the government. It includes 
several aspects described below. 
 
* According to the targets set for deregulation, it is very important for the government to 
consider carefully at the beginning on: how many markets should be organized throughout 
the country; who should be responsible to organize the power markets, how to organize 
gencos, transcos and discos; what are their functions; who is responsible for market opera-
tion and/or system operation; how to develop market rules; who is responsible for market 
surveillance; how to transit from current regulated market to future competitive market; etc. 
A timetable should also be developed for execution. It is clear that a lot of negotiations and 
government decisions should be made at this level in order to make deregulation process 
successful. International consultant might be helpful, however for the different economic 
and technical backgrounds, it is more important to rely on own conditions and experts to 
make final decision. 
* After the fundamental decisions in launching the deregulation, the market rule devel-
opment is a key step. A lot of lessons have been obtained in this aspect. For developing 
countries, copying power market rules of other countries or other markets such as natural 
gas etc. might lead to severe results. The market rules should be different from market to 
market with only principles unchanged. Therefore all market participants (suppliers, con-
sumers, brokers, operators etc.) should have rights to join or examine rule development with 
consideration on all economic, technical and physical backgrounds, conditions and trends. 
The rule should try to be a perfect set on market organization, market functions, goods to be 
exchanged and services to be provided, sub-markets definition (futures, forward, option, 
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day-ahead, and balancing markets for electricity as well as the markets for transmission ser-
vice and ancillary service, etc.), pricing mechanism, participants and relevant regulation, 
market operation and system operation rules under normal and emergency cases, settle-
ment, surveillance, etc. The rule should be revised from time to time to meet new requests 
and evolve gradually.  
* Another important task in power market operation is to develop a reliable computer 
supporting system to manage bilateral contract records, day-ahead market bidding and 
MCP - power selling/buying calculation, congestion management, and market information 
announcement etc. 
 
It should be pointed out that different markets have different potential risks in operation, to 
which special attentions should be paid. The issue is discussed below. 
 
9.4.1.3 Consideration on risks and their mitigations 
To realize successful running of the power markets, a significant issue is to examine careful-
ly the potential risks existing in a specific power market. The risks include natural resource 
types, amount and relevant risks, economic development in the market area, gencos and 
consumers’ features, grid characteristics, potential market power, risk in power markets of 
single-buyer mode, special reliability and security issues in power system operation, power 
system planning/expansion in market environment, possibility of power exchange with 
adjacent power markets and relevant issues, and possible local government interference, etc. 
 
For a power market operating very well for years, we should not say the market is perfect 
until it operates very well under extremely severe market conditions and can also keep 
power system sustainable and efficient development for a relatively longer time horizon.  
Some risks, which are often appeared in the developing countries, will be discussed briefly 
in more detail below. 
 
Unbalanced economic development within the market area. When a power market covers both 
rural area and industrial area, the power generation in rural area usually has lower 
electricity price than that in industrial area if there is no power exchange between the two 
areas or if special price policy is applied to the rural consumers. When they are in the same 
market, discriminating price or proper measures should be taken to protect rural area 
consumers. Otherwise, industrial area users would like to sign bilateral contract with gencos 
in rural area at lower prices and the electricity price in that area will rise and have negative 
impacts to rural users. 
 
Hydraulic resource and hydrothermal dispatch in market environment. When a certain area has 
a higher hydraulic capacity ratio and/or the hydraulic resources should also be used for 
navigation, irrigation and flood control purposes controlled by the government agent, the 
risk of hydraulic power generation may occur. Basically there are several ways to dispatch 
hydropower: central dispatch with priority for hydropower taking care of peak load to 
maximize social welfare, thus all hydropower can get maximum benefits. However this 
might have negative impacts on thermal power generation profits especially when water 
resource is rich in certain years. However if hydraulic power plants bid in the same way 
as thermal power plants, the hydraulic resources might not be used efficiently. Besides 
some compensation should be provided to hydraulic power plants for their loss caused by 
diversified usages of water resources. Therefore certain rules should be developed to 
manage the case to make both thermal and hydraulic power companies have proper 
profits with incentives to make further investment to the power markets when load 
grows. 
 
Market power. When a market has few power generation companies, the company with 
large market share is able to control the price and get high profits from it. Such market 
power is harmful to consumers and may reduce social welfare noticeably. Therefore 
market share and/or capacity limits should be applied to any gencos. Grid congestion is 
another source of market power. Improperly defined transmission rights or congestion 
management rules can be utilized by market participants and strengthen the locational 
market power. In peak load condition or when large units are under maintenance, some 
machines become ‘must-run’, the market power can be severe. In addition to well-defined 
market rules to manage congestion and mitigate market power, market power existence 
and severity should be supervised constantly. Market surveillance and certain penalty 
should be applied to solve the issue. 
 
Reliable and secure power system operation under market environment. This is the most 
significant issue in deregulation. The power system deregulation should not sacrifice the 
system operation reliability and security. However the risk does exist. Lots of reasons can 
cause the issue, such as lack of reserve capacity, lack of reactive power supply and voltage 
control, poor organization of real-time power balancing market, poor emergency control 
and restorative control, wrong load forecasting and/or poor generation and transmission 
expansion planning which in turn leads to inadequacy of capacity, etc. In developing 
country, the grid construction may lag behind the generator installation and the resultant 
stressed network may cause severe problems under large and small disturbances.  
 
Centralized dispatch is highly recommended in such case to make full use of system-wide 
resources to avoid system instability and collapse. In principle, the economic issue such as 
various transactions should be determined by market rules before real time operation. 
Even if the resource/service is used/provided in real-time, it should be scheduled 
beforehand regarding to time, price, quantity, and the way to use/provide. However 
secure and reliable system operation should be realized in real-time absolutely through 
central dispatch and control and the system operator should have the authority to make 
decision according to load demand, power quality and security requests etc. under 
normal and emergency conditions. The difference of system operation with or without 
power market existence is that in power markets the operator should dispatch/use the 
available resource according to bilateral contracts, day-ahead market, ancillary service 
market outcomes determined beforehand.  
 
Considering former monopolistic operation condition, existing EMS and operation 
experience, it is recommended to have two computer systems for market operation and 
system operation respectively but with real-time link to each other for information 
exchange, software/database sharing and necessary mutual support. The same institute 
will manage both computer systems to realize cost-effective operation and well 
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day-ahead, and balancing markets for electricity as well as the markets for transmission ser-
vice and ancillary service, etc.), pricing mechanism, participants and relevant regulation, 
market operation and system operation rules under normal and emergency cases, settle-
ment, surveillance, etc. The rule should be revised from time to time to meet new requests 
and evolve gradually.  
* Another important task in power market operation is to develop a reliable computer 
supporting system to manage bilateral contract records, day-ahead market bidding and 
MCP - power selling/buying calculation, congestion management, and market information 
announcement etc. 
 
It should be pointed out that different markets have different potential risks in operation, to 
which special attentions should be paid. The issue is discussed below. 
 
9.4.1.3 Consideration on risks and their mitigations 
To realize successful running of the power markets, a significant issue is to examine careful-
ly the potential risks existing in a specific power market. The risks include natural resource 
types, amount and relevant risks, economic development in the market area, gencos and 
consumers’ features, grid characteristics, potential market power, risk in power markets of 
single-buyer mode, special reliability and security issues in power system operation, power 
system planning/expansion in market environment, possibility of power exchange with 
adjacent power markets and relevant issues, and possible local government interference, etc. 
 
For a power market operating very well for years, we should not say the market is perfect 
until it operates very well under extremely severe market conditions and can also keep 
power system sustainable and efficient development for a relatively longer time horizon.  
Some risks, which are often appeared in the developing countries, will be discussed briefly 
in more detail below. 
 
Unbalanced economic development within the market area. When a power market covers both 
rural area and industrial area, the power generation in rural area usually has lower 
electricity price than that in industrial area if there is no power exchange between the two 
areas or if special price policy is applied to the rural consumers. When they are in the same 
market, discriminating price or proper measures should be taken to protect rural area 
consumers. Otherwise, industrial area users would like to sign bilateral contract with gencos 
in rural area at lower prices and the electricity price in that area will rise and have negative 
impacts to rural users. 
 
Hydraulic resource and hydrothermal dispatch in market environment. When a certain area has 
a higher hydraulic capacity ratio and/or the hydraulic resources should also be used for 
navigation, irrigation and flood control purposes controlled by the government agent, the 
risk of hydraulic power generation may occur. Basically there are several ways to dispatch 
hydropower: central dispatch with priority for hydropower taking care of peak load to 
maximize social welfare, thus all hydropower can get maximum benefits. However this 
might have negative impacts on thermal power generation profits especially when water 
resource is rich in certain years. However if hydraulic power plants bid in the same way 
as thermal power plants, the hydraulic resources might not be used efficiently. Besides 
some compensation should be provided to hydraulic power plants for their loss caused by 
diversified usages of water resources. Therefore certain rules should be developed to 
manage the case to make both thermal and hydraulic power companies have proper 
profits with incentives to make further investment to the power markets when load 
grows. 
 
Market power. When a market has few power generation companies, the company with 
large market share is able to control the price and get high profits from it. Such market 
power is harmful to consumers and may reduce social welfare noticeably. Therefore 
market share and/or capacity limits should be applied to any gencos. Grid congestion is 
another source of market power. Improperly defined transmission rights or congestion 
management rules can be utilized by market participants and strengthen the locational 
market power. In peak load condition or when large units are under maintenance, some 
machines become ‘must-run’, the market power can be severe. In addition to well-defined 
market rules to manage congestion and mitigate market power, market power existence 
and severity should be supervised constantly. Market surveillance and certain penalty 
should be applied to solve the issue. 
 
Reliable and secure power system operation under market environment. This is the most 
significant issue in deregulation. The power system deregulation should not sacrifice the 
system operation reliability and security. However the risk does exist. Lots of reasons can 
cause the issue, such as lack of reserve capacity, lack of reactive power supply and voltage 
control, poor organization of real-time power balancing market, poor emergency control 
and restorative control, wrong load forecasting and/or poor generation and transmission 
expansion planning which in turn leads to inadequacy of capacity, etc. In developing 
country, the grid construction may lag behind the generator installation and the resultant 
stressed network may cause severe problems under large and small disturbances.  
 
Centralized dispatch is highly recommended in such case to make full use of system-wide 
resources to avoid system instability and collapse. In principle, the economic issue such as 
various transactions should be determined by market rules before real time operation. 
Even if the resource/service is used/provided in real-time, it should be scheduled 
beforehand regarding to time, price, quantity, and the way to use/provide. However 
secure and reliable system operation should be realized in real-time absolutely through 
central dispatch and control and the system operator should have the authority to make 
decision according to load demand, power quality and security requests etc. under 
normal and emergency conditions. The difference of system operation with or without 
power market existence is that in power markets the operator should dispatch/use the 
available resource according to bilateral contracts, day-ahead market, ancillary service 
market outcomes determined beforehand.  
 
Considering former monopolistic operation condition, existing EMS and operation 
experience, it is recommended to have two computer systems for market operation and 
system operation respectively but with real-time link to each other for information 
exchange, software/database sharing and necessary mutual support. The same institute 
will manage both computer systems to realize cost-effective operation and well 
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coordination. A system operator should get some training on market operation and vice 
versa so that he/she can understand the impacts of market environment on system 
operation very well. 
 
Electricity pricing and demand elasticity. Pricing is a core issue in power markets. Bidding 
strategies are worked out based on pricing mechanism. For most power markets, MCP is 
used to determine day-ahead market price and electricity production amounts, which are 
then revised according to congestions if any. If the pay-as-bid principle is used in spot 
pricing, the ISO of a single buyer market can get significant benefits.  
 
A disco, who buys electricity from the market and sell it to the end users, may suffer from 
fixed electricity price for end users. The load elasticity is very important in power 
markets. Market failure might happen when the energy supply price is extremely high 
while end user cannot see it. 
 
Other merchandises in power markets should have their prices well defined as well. 
However at the beginning stage, the market rules should be simple and practical. Some 
services, such as reactive power supply and voltage control, reserve capacity, AGC etc. 
can be considered as a whole by the ISO and then distribute the cost to users as a lumped 
‘uplift’. The users’ bill will not show the price for each service. This can be improved 
gradually when the technology is mature. 
 
Smooth transition to the market environment. This is also an important point in deregulation. 
A violent transition should be avoided. Usually when a market has adequate generation 
capacity and the supply is a little greater than demand, it is a good time to start power 
markets. The price will be smooth in transition and market rules can be tested under 
normal conditions first. Operators can practice in the real market environment. In this 
case, reliable and secure system operation can usually be ensured. Otherwise risk will 
appear in the test operation of power markets. 
 
Power system planning in market environment. Under market environments, generation and 
transmission network expansion are vital to power industry sustainable development. 
Accurate load and fuel price forecasting and correct estimation of profits are very 
important. Government policy and market rules in power system planning also play an 
important role in system expansion. In order to attract enough generation investments, a 
key point to developing countries, some rules with bias to gencos have to be applied. A 
typical price policy is two-part electricity price including capacity price and energy price, 
which can greatly reduce gencos’ risks in capital return and encourage generation 
investments effectively. This price policy is now used in NE China regional power market. 
In the meantime, to let grid company (which may also be the operator of both power 
market and power system) have enough income as transmission network capital return 
and for future development, transmission service price can be set at a relatively higher 
level.  
 
In power system planning, it is important to have an authorized institute to make 
centralized optimal planning with participation of market participants based on the 
information of economic development, load forecasting, energy resources available etc. 
Interested companies can then bid for power plant expansion and construction. However 
the transmission network expansion is a problem since it is difficult to get investment 
back in a short period through transmission service charge. The incentives to invest 
transmission line construction are therefore unclear. And the stressed network may lead 
to system instability under disturbances and even blackout under cascaded faults. Special 
measures and policies should be applied to solve the problem. 
 
9.4.1.4 Other considerations 
To ensure fairness, justice and transparency in market competition, government should have 
minimum interference to the markets. But special purpose committees can be organized to 
manage the overall power industry policy, energy planning and investment consideration, 
market surveillance, etc.  
 
The market rules should also define duties, rights and benefits of individual market 
participants; include extraordinary operations of markets such as emergency stop, termination 
and re-start conditions and procedures.  
 
In order to promote power exchange and obtain more economic benefits and social welfare, 
transaction between markets are highly encouraged which include hydrothermal coordination 
across the markets, emergency support to reduce reserve capacity cost, and peak-load-time-
difference utilization, etc.  
 
In certain area, special policies on electricity tariff are applied to special users, such as 
compensation to rural area users and special local industry, etc. This policy may exist at the 
beginning stage of power markets. It will be reduced and eliminated gradually when market is 
mature. 
 
In general power system deregulation is a kind of ‘system engineering’, which is relevant to 
various aspects including economy, politics, society, engineering and technology. The success 
of power system deregulation will have great impacts on overall society and national 
economic development. 
 
9.4.2 Power Markets in NE and NW China 
China is a developing country in Asia with fast economic development in recent years. By the 
end of 2004, the total generation capacity reaches 447 GW, ranking at No. 2 in the world. Its 
electricity is still in short supply for the fast blooming economy. 
 
Huge population, fast economic development and electricity demand growth cause severe 
burden of the government under traditional vertically monopolistic operation mode, in which 
the government is responsible for the investment of main power plants and transmission 
grids. In order to attract diversified resources to invest power industry, power system 
deregulation and power market establishment to ensure fair competition is the best and 
sustainable way to solve the problem. 
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coordination. A system operator should get some training on market operation and vice 
versa so that he/she can understand the impacts of market environment on system 
operation very well. 
 
Electricity pricing and demand elasticity. Pricing is a core issue in power markets. Bidding 
strategies are worked out based on pricing mechanism. For most power markets, MCP is 
used to determine day-ahead market price and electricity production amounts, which are 
then revised according to congestions if any. If the pay-as-bid principle is used in spot 
pricing, the ISO of a single buyer market can get significant benefits.  
 
A disco, who buys electricity from the market and sell it to the end users, may suffer from 
fixed electricity price for end users. The load elasticity is very important in power 
markets. Market failure might happen when the energy supply price is extremely high 
while end user cannot see it. 
 
Other merchandises in power markets should have their prices well defined as well. 
However at the beginning stage, the market rules should be simple and practical. Some 
services, such as reactive power supply and voltage control, reserve capacity, AGC etc. 
can be considered as a whole by the ISO and then distribute the cost to users as a lumped 
‘uplift’. The users’ bill will not show the price for each service. This can be improved 
gradually when the technology is mature. 
 
Smooth transition to the market environment. This is also an important point in deregulation. 
A violent transition should be avoided. Usually when a market has adequate generation 
capacity and the supply is a little greater than demand, it is a good time to start power 
markets. The price will be smooth in transition and market rules can be tested under 
normal conditions first. Operators can practice in the real market environment. In this 
case, reliable and secure system operation can usually be ensured. Otherwise risk will 
appear in the test operation of power markets. 
 
Power system planning in market environment. Under market environments, generation and 
transmission network expansion are vital to power industry sustainable development. 
Accurate load and fuel price forecasting and correct estimation of profits are very 
important. Government policy and market rules in power system planning also play an 
important role in system expansion. In order to attract enough generation investments, a 
key point to developing countries, some rules with bias to gencos have to be applied. A 
typical price policy is two-part electricity price including capacity price and energy price, 
which can greatly reduce gencos’ risks in capital return and encourage generation 
investments effectively. This price policy is now used in NE China regional power market. 
In the meantime, to let grid company (which may also be the operator of both power 
market and power system) have enough income as transmission network capital return 
and for future development, transmission service price can be set at a relatively higher 
level.  
 
In power system planning, it is important to have an authorized institute to make 
centralized optimal planning with participation of market participants based on the 
information of economic development, load forecasting, energy resources available etc. 
Interested companies can then bid for power plant expansion and construction. However 
the transmission network expansion is a problem since it is difficult to get investment 
back in a short period through transmission service charge. The incentives to invest 
transmission line construction are therefore unclear. And the stressed network may lead 
to system instability under disturbances and even blackout under cascaded faults. Special 
measures and policies should be applied to solve the problem. 
 
9.4.1.4 Other considerations 
To ensure fairness, justice and transparency in market competition, government should have 
minimum interference to the markets. But special purpose committees can be organized to 
manage the overall power industry policy, energy planning and investment consideration, 
market surveillance, etc.  
 
The market rules should also define duties, rights and benefits of individual market 
participants; include extraordinary operations of markets such as emergency stop, termination 
and re-start conditions and procedures.  
 
In order to promote power exchange and obtain more economic benefits and social welfare, 
transaction between markets are highly encouraged which include hydrothermal coordination 
across the markets, emergency support to reduce reserve capacity cost, and peak-load-time-
difference utilization, etc.  
 
In certain area, special policies on electricity tariff are applied to special users, such as 
compensation to rural area users and special local industry, etc. This policy may exist at the 
beginning stage of power markets. It will be reduced and eliminated gradually when market is 
mature. 
 
In general power system deregulation is a kind of ‘system engineering’, which is relevant to 
various aspects including economy, politics, society, engineering and technology. The success 
of power system deregulation will have great impacts on overall society and national 
economic development. 
 
9.4.2 Power Markets in NE and NW China 
China is a developing country in Asia with fast economic development in recent years. By the 
end of 2004, the total generation capacity reaches 447 GW, ranking at No. 2 in the world. Its 
electricity is still in short supply for the fast blooming economy. 
 
Huge population, fast economic development and electricity demand growth cause severe 
burden of the government under traditional vertically monopolistic operation mode, in which 
the government is responsible for the investment of main power plants and transmission 
grids. In order to attract diversified resources to invest power industry, power system 
deregulation and power market establishment to ensure fair competition is the best and 
sustainable way to solve the problem. 
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The main steps in power system deregulation in China are as follows25-28. In Dec. 1998, the 
State Council of China announced to launch power industry reform in China. In the first stage, 
the restructuring was focus on forming independent power companies and grid companies. 
Five provincial power markets and Shanghai power market were built up and tested as 
pioneers. Competition was introduced to gencos and the markets were in the single buyer 
mode. However the provincial power markets only covered small areas, which strongly 
limited the power exchange across the provinces and the goal of optimal use of resources over 
a wide region could not be realized. In Feb. 2002, the State Council of China announced a new 
document of ‘The Scheme of Power System Reform’. In this document, it is declared that to 
form regional power markets will be the future direction of power industry restructuring in 
China. In Dec. 2002, two independent grid companies were formed. They are S. China Grid 
Company and the State Grid Company. The latter includes 5 regional grid companies. They 
are Northeast, Northwest, N. China, E. China and Central China Grid Companies. The 
traditional government owned power plants were reformed into five generation-group 
companies with their individual shares in each regional power market less than 20%. In March 
2003, the State Power Market Surveillance Commission (SPSC) started to work. Under the 
leadership of SPSC, Northeast and East China regional power markets were built up and 
committed to test operation in January and May of 2004 respectively. In the meantime all 
original provincial power markets were asked to stop operation. Other regional grid 
companies are actively making R&D to ensure well design and optimal operation of future 
regional power market and avoid any potential risks. 
 
The power market in NE China and R&D work in NW China will be discussed below. 
 
9.4.2.1 Northeast Regional Power Market in China 
The Northeast region covers three provinces (Hei-long-jiang, Ji-lin and Liao-ning) of NE China 
and East of Inner-Mongolia with the population of 100M and generation capacity of 41GW 
(85% thermal power and 15% hydropower) at the end of 2003. The rich coalmines in the north 
and heavy load in the south cause a long transmission corridor from N. to S. of the region. In 
addition, a short power transmission corridor exists in mid-region from west (thermal power) 
and east (hydraulic power) to central part. The NE has been interconnected to N. China to sell 
their electricity. 
 
From the Northeast Regional Power Market, we can see some rules which are typically 
defined based on developing country conditions and significant to secure operation and 
sustainable development. 
 
* The NE Grid Company owns the regional transmission network and runs the regional 
power market and power system in parallel. It is also responsible for organizing generation 
planning and transmission planning according to the load forecasting although the Grid Com-
pany is not responsible for the construction of power plants. 
* The NE Grid Company keeps main hydraulic power plants in hand (10% in capacity) for 
frequency control and peak load dispatch to avoid sky-high prices under heavily loading con-
ditions. 
* Two-part electricity pricing is used, in which capacity price and energy price are separate. 
The capacity price is defined by the State Tariff Department, while energy price is generated 
through competition. This is good to encourage future investment in power generation and 
solve sunk-cost issue. 
* The market in its first stage adopts single buyer mode. For long-term contract, pay-as-bid 
rule is applied for settlement, which can protect the benefits of the Grid Company and con-
sumers. For day-ahead spot market, MCP is used. In general major energy transactions are 
through forward contract (round 80-90% of total power exchange); only a small amount is 
exchanged through spot market. Besides the generation option market is under organization to 
reduce gencos’ risks. 
* All transmission and ancillary services are centrally dispatched and the cost is distributed 
to consumers as a ‘transmission cost’ in average cost nature, which is also examined by the 
state Tariff Department. In order to avoid high service price, each power plant should provide 
certain reactive power and reserve power and join voltage and frequency regulation without 
payment. Later on a compensation method will be worked out. 
* Bilateral transaction is limited to large consumers and power plants as test right now. It 
will be gradually increase. Currently only machines at or above 200MW are in the market. 
Later on it can be generators at or above 100MW. 
* Ancillary service market is under consideration. Competition among discos and the tran-
sition of the market from single buyer to whole sale modes are also under consideration. But 
these will commit only when the current market operates well and experiences have been cu-
mulated enough. 
 
9.4.3 R&D for Future Northwest Regional Power Market 
The Northwest Grid covers four provinces or autonomous region. They are Shan-xi, Gan-su, 
Ning-xia and Qing-hai. Its area is about one seventh of China. By the end of 2003, the total 
generation capacity was 20 GW with 65% thermal and 35% hydraulic power. However the 
economic development is quite unbalanced in the region, relatively rich in Shan-xi and poor in 
Qing-hai. Hence the electricity prices are quite different in the two areas. The upper Yellow 
river provides rich hydraulic resources. However the request of nevegation, irrigation and 
floor protection, which is controlled by certain official organization, may significantly reduce 
the profits of hydraulic power plants and bring about difficulties in day-to-day dispatch. 
Another issue is caused by larger area and lower population density, which means more 
transmission system investment. The western area hydraulic power and eastern area thermal 
power can be dispatched properly to yield most economic benefits. The peak load time differ-
ence between western and eastern areas also asks for large amount of power transfer between 
east and west parts. However currently relative weak network may lead to severe congestion 
and relevant market power if power market is committed. The region is going to interconnect 
to N. China and Central China Grids to sell electricity to the two regions. 
 
Based on the facts mentioned above, NW Grid Company is actively conducting R&D towards 
future power market operation. Three R&D projects have been implemented with the help of 
universities. The three projects covered the following three aspects respectively (i) overall 
market structure, market operation mode and market rule etc.; (ii) pricing mechanism and grid 
average transmission cost estimation; and (iii) potential risks and their mitigations in the NW 
Regional Power Market. The last project was jointly implemented by the University of Hong 
Kong and NW Power Grid Company. 
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The main steps in power system deregulation in China are as follows25-28. In Dec. 1998, the 
State Council of China announced to launch power industry reform in China. In the first stage, 
the restructuring was focus on forming independent power companies and grid companies. 
Five provincial power markets and Shanghai power market were built up and tested as 
pioneers. Competition was introduced to gencos and the markets were in the single buyer 
mode. However the provincial power markets only covered small areas, which strongly 
limited the power exchange across the provinces and the goal of optimal use of resources over 
a wide region could not be realized. In Feb. 2002, the State Council of China announced a new 
document of ‘The Scheme of Power System Reform’. In this document, it is declared that to 
form regional power markets will be the future direction of power industry restructuring in 
China. In Dec. 2002, two independent grid companies were formed. They are S. China Grid 
Company and the State Grid Company. The latter includes 5 regional grid companies. They 
are Northeast, Northwest, N. China, E. China and Central China Grid Companies. The 
traditional government owned power plants were reformed into five generation-group 
companies with their individual shares in each regional power market less than 20%. In March 
2003, the State Power Market Surveillance Commission (SPSC) started to work. Under the 
leadership of SPSC, Northeast and East China regional power markets were built up and 
committed to test operation in January and May of 2004 respectively. In the meantime all 
original provincial power markets were asked to stop operation. Other regional grid 
companies are actively making R&D to ensure well design and optimal operation of future 
regional power market and avoid any potential risks. 
 
The power market in NE China and R&D work in NW China will be discussed below. 
 
9.4.2.1 Northeast Regional Power Market in China 
The Northeast region covers three provinces (Hei-long-jiang, Ji-lin and Liao-ning) of NE China 
and East of Inner-Mongolia with the population of 100M and generation capacity of 41GW 
(85% thermal power and 15% hydropower) at the end of 2003. The rich coalmines in the north 
and heavy load in the south cause a long transmission corridor from N. to S. of the region. In 
addition, a short power transmission corridor exists in mid-region from west (thermal power) 
and east (hydraulic power) to central part. The NE has been interconnected to N. China to sell 
their electricity. 
 
From the Northeast Regional Power Market, we can see some rules which are typically 
defined based on developing country conditions and significant to secure operation and 
sustainable development. 
 
* The NE Grid Company owns the regional transmission network and runs the regional 
power market and power system in parallel. It is also responsible for organizing generation 
planning and transmission planning according to the load forecasting although the Grid Com-
pany is not responsible for the construction of power plants. 
* The NE Grid Company keeps main hydraulic power plants in hand (10% in capacity) for 
frequency control and peak load dispatch to avoid sky-high prices under heavily loading con-
ditions. 
* Two-part electricity pricing is used, in which capacity price and energy price are separate. 
The capacity price is defined by the State Tariff Department, while energy price is generated 
through competition. This is good to encourage future investment in power generation and 
solve sunk-cost issue. 
* The market in its first stage adopts single buyer mode. For long-term contract, pay-as-bid 
rule is applied for settlement, which can protect the benefits of the Grid Company and con-
sumers. For day-ahead spot market, MCP is used. In general major energy transactions are 
through forward contract (round 80-90% of total power exchange); only a small amount is 
exchanged through spot market. Besides the generation option market is under organization to 
reduce gencos’ risks. 
* All transmission and ancillary services are centrally dispatched and the cost is distributed 
to consumers as a ‘transmission cost’ in average cost nature, which is also examined by the 
state Tariff Department. In order to avoid high service price, each power plant should provide 
certain reactive power and reserve power and join voltage and frequency regulation without 
payment. Later on a compensation method will be worked out. 
* Bilateral transaction is limited to large consumers and power plants as test right now. It 
will be gradually increase. Currently only machines at or above 200MW are in the market. 
Later on it can be generators at or above 100MW. 
* Ancillary service market is under consideration. Competition among discos and the tran-
sition of the market from single buyer to whole sale modes are also under consideration. But 
these will commit only when the current market operates well and experiences have been cu-
mulated enough. 
 
9.4.3 R&D for Future Northwest Regional Power Market 
The Northwest Grid covers four provinces or autonomous region. They are Shan-xi, Gan-su, 
Ning-xia and Qing-hai. Its area is about one seventh of China. By the end of 2003, the total 
generation capacity was 20 GW with 65% thermal and 35% hydraulic power. However the 
economic development is quite unbalanced in the region, relatively rich in Shan-xi and poor in 
Qing-hai. Hence the electricity prices are quite different in the two areas. The upper Yellow 
river provides rich hydraulic resources. However the request of nevegation, irrigation and 
floor protection, which is controlled by certain official organization, may significantly reduce 
the profits of hydraulic power plants and bring about difficulties in day-to-day dispatch. 
Another issue is caused by larger area and lower population density, which means more 
transmission system investment. The western area hydraulic power and eastern area thermal 
power can be dispatched properly to yield most economic benefits. The peak load time differ-
ence between western and eastern areas also asks for large amount of power transfer between 
east and west parts. However currently relative weak network may lead to severe congestion 
and relevant market power if power market is committed. The region is going to interconnect 
to N. China and Central China Grids to sell electricity to the two regions. 
 
Based on the facts mentioned above, NW Grid Company is actively conducting R&D towards 
future power market operation. Three R&D projects have been implemented with the help of 
universities. The three projects covered the following three aspects respectively (i) overall 
market structure, market operation mode and market rule etc.; (ii) pricing mechanism and grid 
average transmission cost estimation; and (iii) potential risks and their mitigations in the NW 
Regional Power Market. The last project was jointly implemented by the University of Hong 
Kong and NW Power Grid Company. 
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All the R&D projects examined the characteristics of the Grid thoroughly and made valuable 
qualitative and quantitative suggestions on future power market operation. Experiences and 
lessons from world power market practices are also considered in-depth, which laid a solid 
foundation for future successful operation of the power market and secure and reliable 
operation of the power system. 
 
9.5 East China Power Market Development and TRIAL OPERATION  
East China Power Grid (ECPG) covers the geographical areas of Shanghai Municipality, Jiang-
su, Zhejiang, Anhui and Fujian Provinces. By the end of 2003, the total installed capacity in 
East China Power Grid had reached 81,300MW, with total annual electric energy consumption 
of 453TWh. There are 45 substations and power plants at 500KV level. The length of 500KV AC 
transmission lines had reached 7460 Km. 500KV DC transmission lines connect the East China 
Power Grid with Central China Power System where Three Gorge Power Station, the largest in 
the globe, is located. The large scale East China Power Grid offers an excellent platform for the 
trading of energy-related commodities.  
 
The region East China Power Grid covers is one of the fastest economically growing and most 
prosperous regions in China, with a two digit annual GDP increases in recent years. The popu-
lation accounts for 1/6 of China’s, consuming 1/5 of electric energy in China, and having 1/3 
of China’s total economic production. The average per capital GDP in this region is over 1.7 
times of domestic average level. The continuously fast economic growth has triggered two-
digit increases in both energy consumption and peak load for some consecutive years. The fast 
economic growth, together with the dynamic market activities in other sectors and relatively 
advanced market management experience, provide a rather suitable external environment for 
the development of East China Power Market (ECPM).  
 
Before industry restructuring, East China Power Grid, the parental company of four provincial 
grid companies, had a long tradition of executing inter-provincial energy transactions. These 
transactions range from centrally planned proportional allotment, residual energy transac-
tions, to bi-lateral contracts. In general, provincial grid companies participate in such transac-
tions while individual generators do not. In particular, the bi-lateral trading among the prov-
inces is booming in these years. The bi-lateral trading energy has reached 4.855 TWh in 2001, 
11.836TWh in 2002 and 25.594 TWh in 2003, with an average increase rate 129.6%. From a his-
torical viewpoint, these inter-provincial energy trading laid a solid foundation for the devel-
opment of the East China Power Market. 
 
During the period from 2000 to 2003, a number of provinces in east China region have opened 
free electricity markets in a provincial level. These markets were criticized because they offer 
competition only in provincial level. This motivated the idea of inter-provincial markets, 
which is of much the same flavor of Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in USA. 
 
Traditional wisdom suggests that the construction and development of the regional power 
market is a process of learning both international experiences and lessons that have been ac-
cumulated over times. It is also a process of reaching agreement and increasing awareness of 
the market initiatives. From June 2003, when the East China Power Grid was selected as one of 
the regional power market pilots, to May 18th, 2004 when trial market operation started, it 
took almost one year to complete the initial market preparation and construction. The major 
milestones can be listed below: 
 
 In March 2002, China government issued Power Industry Institutional Reform Plan 
(Policy No. 5), which outlines the direction of China’s Power Industry reform. Generation 
business has been separated from transmission business and five major generation companies 
have been formed. The establishment of the regional power market is given the top priority. 
 In June 2003, State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) presided a meeting in 
Shanghai and clearly addressed the intention of establishing a pilot power market in East Chi-
na. 
 According to the Policy No. 5, East China Grid Company Limited (ECG) was estab-
lished on September 28, 2003, which bears leading responsibility for developing ECPM. 
 In November 2003, SERC issued the ECPM Pilot Plan, which is the blue print of the 
power market development.  
 In April 2004, SERC issued the ECPM Codes. 
 On May 18th, 2004, ECPM trial operation was commenced. This is the largest regional 
power market pilot in China. 
 
9.5.1 The Development of the Market 
 
9.5.1.1 Guidelines 
The Policy No. 5 guides the development of ECPM. The market development has to respect 
the unique characteristics of power industry, and international experiences are exploited. It 
starts with the separation of generation from transmission functions, which aims at optimal 
resources allocation by introducing competition into wholesale market. The market is expected 
to facilitate a sustainable and healthy development for power industry in East China Region to 
satisfy the requirement of regional economic growth as well as the needs of people’s life.  
The objectives of ECPM Development include: 
 
♦ Introducing competition, breaking down market barriers and achieving optimal resource 
allocation in the East China region; 
♦ Encouraging power industry to improve management, efficiency and service standard etc; 
♦ Establishing a unified, open, competitive and stable regional power market under gov-
ernment regulation. 
 
9.5.1.2 The principles of market design  
The institutional structure of ECPM is judiciously chosen taking into account the characteris-
tics of energy resources and consumption types within the region, technical requirements, the 
current institutional structure, and local economic conditions29.  
                                                                 
 In the language of Chinese power community, “trial operation” is the first step towards a competitive 
market, followed by “pre-operation”, and “official operation”. In trial operation, market dispatch is 
performed based on bids, settlement is performed but financial transaction is not executed. In “pre-
operation”, financial transaction is executed but the market can be suspended if certain condition (say, 
extremely hot weather) is met. In “official operation”, market can not be suspended in general. 
www.intechopen.com
Status of Power Markets and Power Exchanges in Asia and Australia 355
All the R&D projects examined the characteristics of the Grid thoroughly and made valuable 
qualitative and quantitative suggestions on future power market operation. Experiences and 
lessons from world power market practices are also considered in-depth, which laid a solid 
foundation for future successful operation of the power market and secure and reliable 
operation of the power system. 
 
9.5 East China Power Market Development and TRIAL OPERATION  
East China Power Grid (ECPG) covers the geographical areas of Shanghai Municipality, Jiang-
su, Zhejiang, Anhui and Fujian Provinces. By the end of 2003, the total installed capacity in 
East China Power Grid had reached 81,300MW, with total annual electric energy consumption 
of 453TWh. There are 45 substations and power plants at 500KV level. The length of 500KV AC 
transmission lines had reached 7460 Km. 500KV DC transmission lines connect the East China 
Power Grid with Central China Power System where Three Gorge Power Station, the largest in 
the globe, is located. The large scale East China Power Grid offers an excellent platform for the 
trading of energy-related commodities.  
 
The region East China Power Grid covers is one of the fastest economically growing and most 
prosperous regions in China, with a two digit annual GDP increases in recent years. The popu-
lation accounts for 1/6 of China’s, consuming 1/5 of electric energy in China, and having 1/3 
of China’s total economic production. The average per capital GDP in this region is over 1.7 
times of domestic average level. The continuously fast economic growth has triggered two-
digit increases in both energy consumption and peak load for some consecutive years. The fast 
economic growth, together with the dynamic market activities in other sectors and relatively 
advanced market management experience, provide a rather suitable external environment for 
the development of East China Power Market (ECPM).  
 
Before industry restructuring, East China Power Grid, the parental company of four provincial 
grid companies, had a long tradition of executing inter-provincial energy transactions. These 
transactions range from centrally planned proportional allotment, residual energy transac-
tions, to bi-lateral contracts. In general, provincial grid companies participate in such transac-
tions while individual generators do not. In particular, the bi-lateral trading among the prov-
inces is booming in these years. The bi-lateral trading energy has reached 4.855 TWh in 2001, 
11.836TWh in 2002 and 25.594 TWh in 2003, with an average increase rate 129.6%. From a his-
torical viewpoint, these inter-provincial energy trading laid a solid foundation for the devel-
opment of the East China Power Market. 
 
During the period from 2000 to 2003, a number of provinces in east China region have opened 
free electricity markets in a provincial level. These markets were criticized because they offer 
competition only in provincial level. This motivated the idea of inter-provincial markets, 
which is of much the same flavor of Regional Transmission Organization (RTO) in USA. 
 
Traditional wisdom suggests that the construction and development of the regional power 
market is a process of learning both international experiences and lessons that have been ac-
cumulated over times. It is also a process of reaching agreement and increasing awareness of 
the market initiatives. From June 2003, when the East China Power Grid was selected as one of 
the regional power market pilots, to May 18th, 2004 when trial market operation started, it 
took almost one year to complete the initial market preparation and construction. The major 
milestones can be listed below: 
 
 In March 2002, China government issued Power Industry Institutional Reform Plan 
(Policy No. 5), which outlines the direction of China’s Power Industry reform. Generation 
business has been separated from transmission business and five major generation companies 
have been formed. The establishment of the regional power market is given the top priority. 
 In June 2003, State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) presided a meeting in 
Shanghai and clearly addressed the intention of establishing a pilot power market in East Chi-
na. 
 According to the Policy No. 5, East China Grid Company Limited (ECG) was estab-
lished on September 28, 2003, which bears leading responsibility for developing ECPM. 
 In November 2003, SERC issued the ECPM Pilot Plan, which is the blue print of the 
power market development.  
 In April 2004, SERC issued the ECPM Codes. 
 On May 18th, 2004, ECPM trial operation was commenced. This is the largest regional 
power market pilot in China. 
 
9.5.1 The Development of the Market 
 
9.5.1.1 Guidelines 
The Policy No. 5 guides the development of ECPM. The market development has to respect 
the unique characteristics of power industry, and international experiences are exploited. It 
starts with the separation of generation from transmission functions, which aims at optimal 
resources allocation by introducing competition into wholesale market. The market is expected 
to facilitate a sustainable and healthy development for power industry in East China Region to 
satisfy the requirement of regional economic growth as well as the needs of people’s life.  
The objectives of ECPM Development include: 
 
♦ Introducing competition, breaking down market barriers and achieving optimal resource 
allocation in the East China region; 
♦ Encouraging power industry to improve management, efficiency and service standard etc; 
♦ Establishing a unified, open, competitive and stable regional power market under gov-
ernment regulation. 
 
9.5.1.2 The principles of market design  
The institutional structure of ECPM is judiciously chosen taking into account the characteris-
tics of energy resources and consumption types within the region, technical requirements, the 
current institutional structure, and local economic conditions29.  
                                                                 
 In the language of Chinese power community, “trial operation” is the first step towards a competitive 
market, followed by “pre-operation”, and “official operation”. In trial operation, market dispatch is 
performed based on bids, settlement is performed but financial transaction is not executed. In “pre-
operation”, financial transaction is executed but the market can be suspended if certain condition (say, 
extremely hot weather) is met. In “official operation”, market can not be suspended in general. 
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In the pre-restructuring model, the buyers and sellers are limited only to the provincial power 
companies serving as either single buyers or single sellers who trade for surplus or deficit of 
their own provinces. In the new market, all the market entities are competing on the same re-
gional market platform. This design is expected to produce a better outcome in terms of re-
source allocation over a wider area.  
 
In the preliminary stage of the ECPM, five buyers (four provincial power companies and 
Shanghai Municipal Power Companies), 171 sellers (conventional coal-fueled generators with 
capacity over 100MW) will participate in the centrally controlled regional power market. 
 
A 500KV transmission network that connects the provinces and Shanghai Municipality has 
formed, which facilitates the inter-provincial energy trading. The separation of generation 
from transmission was largely completed by 2004. Shanghai Municipality and Zhejiang Prov-
ince who managed province-based power market pilots have accumulated some experiences 
for the development of the regional market.  
 
9.5.1.3 The stage objectives 
In accordance with the principles of integrated design and phase-in implementation, ECPM 
development shall be implemented in three stages. 
 
 Stage one objective: Let most of the generation companies participate the competitive 
market, and a portion of the energy be centrally traded in the ECPM platform. Investigate to 
allow large customers to directly purchase from generation companies in a controlled fashion. 
Establish legal and regulatory framework for the operation of ECPM. Reform and improve 
pricing mechanisms for electricity. Establish an ECPM coordinated by the region and its prov-
inces. 
 Stage two objectives: Let gradually more generation companies participate in the 
market, thus increase the level of competition; start bi-lateral trade between large customers, 
independent distributors and generation companies, set up ancillary services market and 
transmission rights market, increase trading products; Establish a well functioning market 
regulation framework and a market under unified operational control.  
 Stage three objectives: Introduce competition into retail segment of the industry, and 
allow all eligible customers directly participate in the market competition with more flexible 
trading arrangements and products. Establish financial market for energy and form a unified, 
open, competitive and orderly ECPM under government regulation. 
 
9.5.1.4 The trading arrangements 
At initial stages of market development, market trading is a combination of contract trading 
and physical trading. Contract trading will be the major trading pattern, supplemented by 
physical trading. A small portion of the energy generated by generators is traded in monthly 
market and day-ahead market, the remaining energy is sold to network companies through 
annul contracts for difference (CfDs) and physical contract. Ancillary service is not included in 
this market at this stage. Non-market generators are expected to sign contracts with network 
companies under the guidance of SERC. 
 
In the short term, ECPM trading includes annual contract, monthly contract, day-ahead mar-
ket and real time balancing mechanism. With the development of the market, other forms of 
trading could be introduced such as quarterly competition and weekly competition. At initial 
stages of market development, approximately 85% of energy is determined by annual contract; 
the remaining 15% or so is traded in the market. Depending on the progress of market devel-
opment, the portion of energy exposed to market competition can be increased.  
 
9.5.1.5 Bidding and market clearing mechanism of monthly market 
The monthly market of ECPM, the first market to go under trial operation, was divided into 
two segments. One is for the peak hours trading with a price cap 482 RMB/MWh, the other is 
for the off-peak time with a price cap 321 RMB/MWh. Both markets follow the familiar market 
clearing mechanism while transmission constraints are taking into consideration. Mathemati-
cally, the market clearing is represented as the following linear program in which the mathe-
matical symbols are self-explanatory: 
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 Implicit in the above formula is a zonal transmission model; each province (Prv) is 
considered as a transmission zone. The duals of the above linear program form the zonal 
marginal prices 30. 
 
9.5.2 The trial operation of the market 
According to a SERC order, ECPM trial operation, which started on May 18th, 2004, only 
involves monthly competition. The monthly competition simulates the following processes: 
generator unit registration, bidding, price ranking and information publishing.  
 
In this trial operation, both supplier and buyer should bid and offer for their intended ener-
gy. The price and volume that will be cleared in the monthly market is determined by the 
bidding and offering curve from both generators and provincial buyers respectively, al-
though, it will not be settled during the trial operation period. 
 
However, the provisions of the ECPM Code on market administration and network opera-
tion shall be strictly implemented even during the trial operation period in order for the 
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In the pre-restructuring model, the buyers and sellers are limited only to the provincial power 
companies serving as either single buyers or single sellers who trade for surplus or deficit of 
their own provinces. In the new market, all the market entities are competing on the same re-
gional market platform. This design is expected to produce a better outcome in terms of re-
source allocation over a wider area.  
 
In the preliminary stage of the ECPM, five buyers (four provincial power companies and 
Shanghai Municipal Power Companies), 171 sellers (conventional coal-fueled generators with 
capacity over 100MW) will participate in the centrally controlled regional power market. 
 
A 500KV transmission network that connects the provinces and Shanghai Municipality has 
formed, which facilitates the inter-provincial energy trading. The separation of generation 
from transmission was largely completed by 2004. Shanghai Municipality and Zhejiang Prov-
ince who managed province-based power market pilots have accumulated some experiences 
for the development of the regional market.  
 
9.5.1.3 The stage objectives 
In accordance with the principles of integrated design and phase-in implementation, ECPM 
development shall be implemented in three stages. 
 
 Stage one objective: Let most of the generation companies participate the competitive 
market, and a portion of the energy be centrally traded in the ECPM platform. Investigate to 
allow large customers to directly purchase from generation companies in a controlled fashion. 
Establish legal and regulatory framework for the operation of ECPM. Reform and improve 
pricing mechanisms for electricity. Establish an ECPM coordinated by the region and its prov-
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regulation framework and a market under unified operational control.  
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9.5.1.4 The trading arrangements 
At initial stages of market development, market trading is a combination of contract trading 
and physical trading. Contract trading will be the major trading pattern, supplemented by 
physical trading. A small portion of the energy generated by generators is traded in monthly 
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annul contracts for difference (CfDs) and physical contract. Ancillary service is not included in 
this market at this stage. Non-market generators are expected to sign contracts with network 
companies under the guidance of SERC. 
 
In the short term, ECPM trading includes annual contract, monthly contract, day-ahead mar-
ket and real time balancing mechanism. With the development of the market, other forms of 
trading could be introduced such as quarterly competition and weekly competition. At initial 
stages of market development, approximately 85% of energy is determined by annual contract; 
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9.5.1.5 Bidding and market clearing mechanism of monthly market 
The monthly market of ECPM, the first market to go under trial operation, was divided into 
two segments. One is for the peak hours trading with a price cap 482 RMB/MWh, the other is 
for the off-peak time with a price cap 321 RMB/MWh. Both markets follow the familiar market 
clearing mechanism while transmission constraints are taking into consideration. Mathemati-
cally, the market clearing is represented as the following linear program in which the mathe-
matical symbols are self-explanatory: 
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 Implicit in the above formula is a zonal transmission model; each province (Prv) is 
considered as a transmission zone. The duals of the above linear program form the zonal 
marginal prices 30. 
 
9.5.2 The trial operation of the market 
According to a SERC order, ECPM trial operation, which started on May 18th, 2004, only 
involves monthly competition. The monthly competition simulates the following processes: 
generator unit registration, bidding, price ranking and information publishing.  
 
In this trial operation, both supplier and buyer should bid and offer for their intended ener-
gy. The price and volume that will be cleared in the monthly market is determined by the 
bidding and offering curve from both generators and provincial buyers respectively, al-
though, it will not be settled during the trial operation period. 
 
However, the provisions of the ECPM Code on market administration and network opera-
tion shall be strictly implemented even during the trial operation period in order for the 
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safer operation during simulation stage. Market administration comprises market partici-
pant management, unit registration, market suspension, etc. 
 
9.5.2.1 Simulation results 
 
Results of June 2004 
 
ECPM cleared at total electricity 4.503 TWh with an average price 369.5 RMB/MWh in June 
2004. Respectively, in peak load time the cleared quantity is 3.326 TWh, accounting for 
73.86%, the cleared price is 406.8 RMB/MWh; in off-peak load time the cleared quantity is 
1.177 TWh, accounting for26.14%, and the cleared price is 273.1 RMB/MWh (see Table 9.2 
and Table 9.3 below). 
 
Unit: RMB/MWh; MWh 
Provinces Clear Price Supply Demand Export 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Aggregation 
406.8 
406.8 
406.8 
389.0 
406.8 
538.020 
11895.460 
248.220 
568.680 
75.600 
3325.980 
143.220 
1621.200 
1275.960 
0 
285.600 
3325.980 
394.800 
274.260 
-1027.740 
568.680 
-210.000 
0 
Table 9.2 The simulation results of peak load time in June 2004 
 
 
Unit: RMB/MWh; MWh 
Provinces Clear Price Supply Demand Export 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Aggregation 
273,1 
273,1 
273,1 
272.2 
273.1 
 
266.100 
292.200 
132.000 
434.100 
52.800 
1.177.200 
600 
0 
708.300 
277.800 
190.500 
1177.200 
265.500 
292.200 
-576.300 
156.300 
-137.700 
0 
Table 9.3 The simulation results of off-peak load time in June 2004 
 
The market clearing of on peak and off-peak hours are further illustrated in Figure 9.3 and 
Figure 9.4. 
 
Results of July 2004 
 
ECPM cleared at total electricity 6.820 TWh with an average price 405.4 RMB/MWh in July 
2004. Respectively, in peak load time the cleared quantity is 4.849 TWh, accounting for 
71.09%, the cleared price is 468 RMB/MWh; in off-peak load time the cleared quantity is 
1.972 TWh, accounting for28.91%, and the cleared price is 289.3 RMB/MWh (see Table 9.4 
and Table 9.5 below). 
 
Unit: RMB/MWh; MWh 
Provinces Clear Price Supply Demand Export 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Aggregation 
468.0 
449.0 
468.0 
416.4 
468.0 
1014.258 
2139.620 
607.600 
687.890 
399.280 
4848.648 
954.366 
2070.180 
1059.828 
186.186 
578.088 
4848.648 
59.892 
69.440 
-452.228 
501.704 
-178.808 
0 
Table 9.4 The simulation results of peak load time in June 2004 
 
Unit: RMB/MWh; MWh 
Provinces Clear Price Supply Demand Export 
Shanghai 
Jiangsu 
Zhejiang 
Anhui 
Fujian 
Aggregation 
289.3 
289.3 
289.3 
289.3 
289.3 
 
865.520 
458.490 
244.280 
288.610 
115.010 
1971.910 
0 
193.130 
1399.030 
199.950 
179.800 
1971.910 
865.520 
265.360 
-1154.750 
88.660 
-64.790 
0 
Table 9.5 The simulation results of off-peak load time in Jule 2004 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 The merit curve of peak load time in June 2004 
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safer operation during simulation stage. Market administration comprises market partici-
pant management, unit registration, market suspension, etc. 
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Figure 9.3 The merit curve of peak load time in June 2004 
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Figure 9.4 The merit curve of off-peak load in June 2004 
 
The market clearing of on-peak and off-peak hours are further illustrated in Figure 9.5 and 
Figure 9.6. 
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Figure 9.5 The Merit curves of Peak Load Time in July 2004 
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Figure 9.6 The Merit Curves of Off-peak Load in July 2004 
 
9.5.2.2 Results analysis 
The significance of the regional power market lies in optimizing resource allocation over a 
wider area, compared to the previous provincial power market. The problem is how to 
quantify the significance. In what follows we give a preliminary solution to this question.  
 
The significance can be represented by the market efficiency. According to the principle of 
economics 31 the market efficiency can be quantified by the total surplus, which is the sum of 
consumer’s surplus and producer’s surplus. In the regional power market, the Tie Line 
Flows among the provinces has a significant impact over the market efficiency. Assuming 
the transfer limits of the Tie Line Flows are zero, actual market flows and infinite respective-
ly, the efficiency of the provincial market, actual regional market and ideal regional market 
can be calculated, the results are included in Table 9.6.  
 
From Table 9.6, it can be seen that the market efficiency of the actual regional market is 774 
million RMB, while the province’s is 574 million RMB. The regional power market proved to 
be maximizing the market efficiency. Figure 9.7 further illustrates the relationship between 
tie-line transfer capacities and market efficiency. 
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Unit: million RMB 
 Provincial  Regional Regional (ideal) 
Off-peak, June 
Peak, June 
Off-peak, July 
Peak, July 
Aggregation 
23 
149 
44 
357 
574 
52 
232 
93 
397 
774 
52 
235 
93 
411 
791 
Table 9.6 The regional market efficiency compared with the provinces 
 
Certainly, provincial markets with zero tie-line capacities are rather idealized markets. The 
transactions exist among provincial markets help to improve (provincial) market efficiency. 
However, the difference between an inter-provincial market and a group of provincial mar-
kets with transactions is fundamental.  
 
Another issue that is receiving attention is the simulated deficit of network companies. As a 
result of the tight supply situation, the network companies’ payment in the wholesale mar-
ket has increased on a large scale. The analysis on trial operation revealed that the increased 
payment is 171 million RMB in June, and 334 million RMB in July respectively. The total 
increased payment, 505 million RMB, is far beyond the network companies’ budget. This 
tendency has been one of the major concerns of the regional market. 
 
We complete this section by summarizing the trial operation of the monthly market in Fig-
ure 9.8, where ISO means Independent System Operator. 
 
 
Figure 9.7 Tie line flows affecting market efficiency. 
 
ISO performs settlement
ISO monitors unit performance
ISO execute market dispatch ISO publishes auction results
ISO performs security check
ISO ranks bid prices
Entities bid in prices
ISO conduct market registration
 
Figure 9.8 The Monthly Market Operation. 
 
9.5.3 Lessons and Recommendations  
Despite of the success of the trial operation, there are lessons and recommendations worth 
mentioning. They are summarized in this section. 
 
9.5.3.1 Regulations and policies need to be improved 
The ECPM pilot is developed and operated in a trial fashion under the condition of lacking 
relevant regulations and policies. With the pilot work going, however, improving market 
regulations and policies becomes extremely important. The Electrical Regulatory Ordinance 
has not come forth, the electricity transmission tariff has not been established, and the retail 
prices has not been linked with the wholesale price. The immaturity of legal environment 
has limited the success of ECPM pilot. 
 
9.5.3.2 The supply-demand gap threatens the safety of the power system 
The East China Power Grid has a wide supply-demand gap for the time being. The Month-
ahead market has affected the electricity balance of the provinces, and changed the Demand 
Side Management of the region. Those provinces, which failed to purchase energy in mar-
ket, will lead to heavier pressure on their power supply responsibility. This kind of pressure 
will threaten the safety of network operation because it makes the buyer more irrational also 
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brings the native provincial governments more challenges. A favorable macroscopic envi-
ronment with the understanding and support of the whole society is necessary for changing 
the power industry from the planned economy to the market economy. 
 
9.5.3.3 The tight supply situation results in market price rising rapidly 
Opening the wholesale market under the tight supply situation, will certainly lead to the 
market clear price rising rapidly. This has been proved by the trial operation of the monthly 
ECPM. It was forecasted that the peak supply gap would reach 18,000MW in East China 
Power Grid in summer 2004, further more, the severe condition would continue to develop 
until 2005. The price rising reflects the gap between supply and demand, but the fixed retail 
price makes the final consumer not be aware of the market signal, and on the other hand, 
makes the Grid Company take much financial risks. This is just the story of Pacific Gas and 
Electricity of USA in 2000 market crisis. 
 
9.5.3.4 Risk mitigation methods need to be studied 
A free market is just like a sword with two blades. One blade optimizes the allocation of 
resource, while the other brings enormous risks. Under the environment with incomplete 
regulation and intense situation between supply and demand, the power market risk is 
magnified and focused on transmission utilities. In the first two months of trial operation in 
ECPM, the increased payment of the transmission utilities has been 5.05 hundred million in 
total, which has broken the balance between generation and transmission presently and has 
gone beyond the finance capacity of the transmission utilities. The risk mitigation methods 
need to be studied deeply. 
 
9.5.4 Concluding Remarks 
As one of the pilots of regional power market, ECPM has renovated the provincial power mar-
kets to the regional platform with uniform codes, realized the inter-provincial competition under 
the multiple control area model, and optimized the resources allocation within a wider area. De-
spite of the institutional complexities, the monthly market competition, which adopts a two-way 
bidding mechanism, maximized the market efficiency and enhanced the social welfare. 
 
The trial operation of the regional market has converted administrative relationships be-
tween the market participants into contractual relationships. The responsibilities and obliga-
tions of the market participants are declared by the market codes definitely. At the same 
time, the regional market clearing prices as signals indicate investments on the generation 
and transmission sectors. In addition, the ECPM model offered a good example for further 
restructuring of China power industry. 
 
Although the ECPM faces a lot of difficulties and disadvantageous situations, it is believed 
that market reform will bring positive changes to social welfare and should be pursued 
down the road. To this end, international experiences such as those of Australia, North 
America are exploited. It is likely that the concept of pool-based market, widely accepted in 
the above countries, will be followed in the future market design. Although the suitability of 
Standard Market Design32 remains skeptical, a day-ahead market with zonal marginal prices 
calculated centrally is envisioned. 
Another question that ECPM faces is whether or not it is feasible to centrally manage a mar-
ket with rapidly increasing installed capacity. The total installed capacity of the market will 
exceed 100,000MW in 2011. An extra-large scale market presents challenges to fundamental 
control center functions such as but not limited to security analysis, real-time dispatch, unit 
commitment, ancillary service provision, and AGC. This is in fact a question of common 
interest in the power community33. 
 
9.6 Status and Perspective of Electric Power Industry in Korea  
In recent years, the electric power industry in which monopoly had been taken for granted, has expe-
rienced drastic shifts. These changes have triggered active movements toward competition through 
industrial restructuring and liberalization. In step with this trend, Korea has gradually carried out 
privatization in the state-monopolized industry. Our objective is not only to overcome management 
inefficiency but also to restructure it in a way to more effectively befit the market competition. To 
begin, the generation sector has been divided into six separate segments according to the similarity of 
fuel composition and generation capacity. Also, the Korea Electricity Commission (KOREC) was 
established as a regulatory body and the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) was opened in 2001. 
 
9.6.1 Korea Power Exchange 
FOR decades, the electric power industry of Korea had been monopolized by the state-run Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). However, deregulation of the industry became indispensable 
so as to establish a competitive electricity market in which electricity can be traded as a commodity. 
In this context, a market in which electricity can be bought and sold has formed and competition 
among generation companies has commenced since April 2001. 
 
 
Figure 9.9 KPX’s main functions 
 
The Korea Power Exchange (KPX) was introduced on April 4, 2001 as a non-profit indepen-
dent organization in accordance with Article 35 of the Electricity Business Law to perform 
main functions, that is, market and system operations, settlement, revision of market rules, 
administration for regular and associate members, load forecast and establishment of a power 
development plan, and so on. The KPX’s mission can be briefly described in Figure 9.9.  
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brings the native provincial governments more challenges. A favorable macroscopic envi-
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calculated centrally is envisioned. 
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9.6 Status and Perspective of Electric Power Industry in Korea  
In recent years, the electric power industry in which monopoly had been taken for granted, has expe-
rienced drastic shifts. These changes have triggered active movements toward competition through 
industrial restructuring and liberalization. In step with this trend, Korea has gradually carried out 
privatization in the state-monopolized industry. Our objective is not only to overcome management 
inefficiency but also to restructure it in a way to more effectively befit the market competition. To 
begin, the generation sector has been divided into six separate segments according to the similarity of 
fuel composition and generation capacity. Also, the Korea Electricity Commission (KOREC) was 
established as a regulatory body and the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) was opened in 2001. 
 
9.6.1 Korea Power Exchange 
FOR decades, the electric power industry of Korea had been monopolized by the state-run Korea 
Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO). However, deregulation of the industry became indispensable 
so as to establish a competitive electricity market in which electricity can be traded as a commodity. 
In this context, a market in which electricity can be bought and sold has formed and competition 
among generation companies has commenced since April 2001. 
 
 
Figure 9.9 KPX’s main functions 
 
The Korea Power Exchange (KPX) was introduced on April 4, 2001 as a non-profit indepen-
dent organization in accordance with Article 35 of the Electricity Business Law to perform 
main functions, that is, market and system operations, settlement, revision of market rules, 
administration for regular and associate members, load forecast and establishment of a power 
development plan, and so on. The KPX’s mission can be briefly described in Figure 9.9.  
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The futuristic reform of the electricity market will be addressed as a transition from the gen-
eration competition market to the wholesale competition and finally the retail competition 
market34. Accordingly, the structure will be changed from Cost-Based Pool (CBP) to Price-
Based Pool (PBP) and eventually to Two-Way Bidding Pool (TWBP) in Figure 9.10. 
 
At the generation competition stage, the principles of reform include the adoption of the free 
competitive environment among the subsidiary generation companies, separation of the 
distribution business, privatization, establishment of independent regulatory authorities 
and the bilateral power exchanges available only to large customers. At the wholesale com-
petition stage, the distribution and the sales business will be monopolized on a regional ba-
sis and the consumers' right in choosing the electricity supplier will be gradually elevated. 
In the long run, at the retail competition stage, the regional monopoly of distribution busi-
ness and sales companies will not be prevented until 2009. There will be new sales compa-
nies such as the consumer associations and the expert power sales companies, which will 
reflect prospects from consumer-oriented viewpoint. The application of PBP and TWBP will 
be timely made subject to the change of the situation in the market structure. 
 
 
Figure 9.10 CBP vs. TWBP. 
 
9.6.2 Overview of Korean Electricity Industry 
Due to the increasing demand of electricity with a growth rate of over 7.5% per annum, the 
industry had the total electricity generating capacity of 56,053 (MW) in 2003. In 2015, the 
capacity will be approximately 1.5 times as much as current capacity, which will come to 
77,023 (MW) and be expected to sufficiently meet the forecast load-demand. Figure 9.11 
shows the installed capacity according to the source of power and individual generating 
companies, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 9.11 Installed generating capacity according to resources and GENCOs 
 
 
Figure 9.12 Daily average trading volume. 
 
In April 2001, KEPCO's generation sector was split into six power generation subsidiaries in-
cluding one big hydro and nuclear power company (Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power company, 
KHNP) and five thermal power companies (Korea East-West Power Co., LTD., Korea South-
East Power Co., LTD., Korea Midland Power Co., LTD., Korea Southern Power Co., LTD., Ko-
rea Western Power Co., LTD.) on an equal basis in terms of commercial and technical aspects. 
Particularly, KHNP will remain as a public entity in consideration of nuclear safety, the cha-
racteristics of power supply and demand, nuclear power development, and the capability of 
building new plants, while the other five power generation companies, consisting of fossil and 
pump storage power plants, will be privatized in the near future. Figure 9.12 depicts the daily 
average trading volume and we have seen a 15 percent increase of the trading volume in 2003 
compared to the same period in last year, as shown in Figure 9.13.  
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Figure 9.13 Total trading amounts from 2001 to 2003. 
 
During the generation competition, the power plants under construction were built as 
planned to keep the capacity reserve margin above 15% by 2005. At the same time, the De-
mand Side Management (DSM) will be strongly implemented to reduce the peak load as 
illustrated in Figure 9.14. To secure the investment resources needed for activating the DSM 
program as previously planned, the collection of "Electricity Supply Industry Foundation 
Funds" for DSM program is legitimized pursuant to article 49 of the Electricity Business Act. 
 
 
Figure 9.14 Positive effect of demand side management program 
In Korea, the seasonal load-demand pattern can be characterized as follows (See Figure 9.15): 
 
 Summer: annual peak load (12:00 ~ 13:00) due to cooling load 
 Winter: peak load (23:00) due to heating load 
 Spring: the lowest load of a year without consuming neither cooling nor heating loads Besides, 
Figure 9.16 and Figure 9.17 represent the summer peak load (47,385 MW on August 22, 2003) 
and the winter peak load (46,387 MW on February 5, 2004), respectively. 
 
 Figure 9.15 Seasonal load-demand pattern 
 
 
Figure 9.16 Hourly load curve for summer peak load on August 22, 2003. 
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Figure 9.16 Hourly load curve for summer peak load on August 22, 2003. 
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Table 9.7 summarizes the transmission and distribution facilities in Korea35. The transmis-
sion lines including both overhead and underground have a length of 28,260 (km) and the 
installed transformers totaled 1,672 in 2003. In addition, the distribution lines run radially 
for a length of 376,454 (km). 
 
Classification 2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
 
Transmission 
line  
(c-km) 
 
Transformer 
capacity 
(MVA) 
 
 
Distribution 
Facilities 
(km, 
1.000Set, EA) 
765 kV 
345 kV 
154 kV 
664kV below 
DC180kV 
Total 
765 kV 
345 KV 
154 KV 
66 KV below 
Total 
Route 
Length 
Supporter 
Transformer 
595 
7.281 
16.747 
1.727 
232 
25.582 
- 
53.115 
70,886 
1,699 
125.700 
 
351.264 
6.439 
1308.947 
662 
7.345 
17.576 
1.540 
232 
27.355 
1.110 
63.577 
78.119 
1.473 
144.279 
 
358.328 
6.695 
1428,510 
662 
7.497 
18.144 
1.402 
232 
27.937 
7.110 
69.078 
83.364 
1.286 
160.838 
 
366.938 
6.875 
1546.088 
662 
7.740 
18.595 
1,031 
232 
28.260 
7.110 
75,660 
89.228 
1.068 
173.066 
 
376.454 
7.171 
1618.889 
Table 9.7 Facilities of transmission and distribution in KOREA 
 
9.6.3 Measures in Power System Operations 
Figure 9.18 is a schematic showing six routes connecting metropolitan regions and others as well as a 
large amount of real power flows through the designated “flowgates”36. More than 40% of system 
load is in the metropolitan region, while the majority of generation is in the non-metropolitan re-
gions. Further, most generating units with low generation costs are scattered all over the non-
metropolitan regions.  
 
For the purpose of economic benefits, therefore, real power generation in non-metropolitan 
regions increases in parallel with the consumption level, resulting in the power transfer 
from the south and central parts of the Korean electric power system to the northwestern 
part through one of the most critical corridors of the grid.  
 
Even more striking is the concept of transfer capability that would be eventually bounded 
by applicable line ratings, reactive support, and dynamic limitations because greater volume 
of power flows into a region in normal states can give rise to cascading failures in the N-1 
steady-state security criteria37, 38. After privatization of generators, power system engineers 
in Korea emphasize that the trend of heavier real power flows into the metropolitan region 
will continue or become profound, and that the constraint of the interface flows will be vital 
to our national-interest transmission bottlenecks, leading to congestion that significantly 
decreases reliability, restricts competition, enhances opportunities for suppliers to exploit 
market power, increases prices to customers, and increases infrastructure vulnerabilities. 
 
 
Figure 9.17 Hourly load curve for winter peak load on February 5, 2004. 
 
 
Figure 9.18 Total transfer capability in tie lines between metropolitan region and adjacent 
regions. 
 
Typically the transmission network planning approach includes a set of fundamentals, some 
realistic events, under which the system must be able to operate and specified consequences 
that are accepted under the operation39. As the electricity sector is getting more and more 
liberalized, a number of questions have been raised regarding the grid planning, e.g., does 
the market opening require network reinforcement and can the market requirements be an 
argument for that reinforcement? The network planning approach now involves a set of 
additional parameters like market prices, transmission pricing, and investment policies.  
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Thus the transition from monopoly to an open electricity market is a global process, which 
has been going on for several years. In an overall perspective the open electricity market 
means liberalizing the sector to create competition in power generation and supply. The 
introduction of the competitive electricity market has resulted in new frameworks and con-
siderations in power system planning and operations.  
 
9.7 Outlook for Power Exchange between Russia, DPRK and ROK 
Since the 1990s, many papers have been published dealing with power system interconnec-
tion between Northeast Asian countries. Electricity trading through NEAREST offers mu-
tual benefits, and can be a good countermeasure to solve the environmental and technical 
problems caused by the independent system operations of each country. Power exchange 
between countries contributes the infrastructure to open trading markets, while intercon-
nected systems between NEA countries will have more technical and economic advantages 
when compared with independent system operation conditions. However, this power sys-
tem interconnection could not become a reality until now due to social, economic and politi-
cal regime differences. Basically, the ROK, the DPRK and Russia have the most powerful 
potential in NEAREST, when their status and future prospects are considered. These three 
countries have different situations and backgrounds on power system interconnection from 
technical, economic and political viewpoints. The ROK power system is an island, having 
been isolated from the DPRK network in 1945. Also, the ROK is very poor in natural re-
sources and must import 97.4% of the total primary energy consumed domestically. Also, 
the ROK has difficulties relating to generation sites. Since the 1980s, the DPRK has suffered 
from a deficiency of electricity supply and wants to be supported by the ROK. After the 
summit between the DPRK and the ROK in 2000, the DPRK has requested electricity sup-
port with a short-term capacity of 500MW, and a long-term capacity of 2,000MW from the 
ROK government. Conversely, East Russia, FER (Far East Russia) and ES (East Siberia), have 
plenty of coal, gas and hydro resources. Also, Russia has surplus power plants and genera-
tion potential due to the economic decline since 1990. Russia has plenty of power export 
potential. Therefore, this section evaluates the prospect of power exchange considering fu-
ture demand/surplus supply plans and exchangeable power in technical and economic as-
pects. 
 
9.7.1 Power interconnection scenarios for “RFE – DPRK - ROK” 
Many scenarios on NEAREST have been published by institutes working on power interconnection 
topics, including as ESI, KERI, and others40-42. Most of these scenario analyses, however, have simply 
estimated the rough parameters of interconnection scenarios, including voltage level, capacity, and 
line length of inter-ties. The basic contents and concepts covered by these scenario analyses have been 
largely similar to each other. The main scenarios either under discussion, or currently being studied, 
are as follows.  
 
9.7.1.1 Potential local interconnections under discussion 
Russia has a plan to interconnect its power grid with that of the DPRK. This interconnection might 
ultimately be extended to the ROK. A number of problems, however, including obtaining financing, 
pose significant barriers to this project. Table 9.8 describes the general ratings of this interconnection 
plan. This project will include a 380km, 500 kV DC line between VLADIVOSTOK and CHEONG-
JIN. This interconnected line will be operated at 220 kV AC during the first stage of the project, and 
will be changed to 500 kV AC operation after the 500 kV line between “CHUGUEVKA-NAHODKA-
VLADIVOSTOK” is put into operation. In its final stage, the line would be modified as a 500 kV 
HVDC line in the future. 
 
Power volume to be transmitted  (mln. kWh) 1500 - 2500 
Load to be transmitted (MW) 300 - 500 
Frequency (Hz) 50 
Voltage (kV) 220/500 
Length of line in Russian territory (km) 250 
Length of line in DPRK territory (km) 130 
Cost of construction (mln. USD) 160 - 180 
Period of construction  (years) 3 - 4 
Period of investment repayment  (years) 8 - 10 
Table 9.8 Overview of interconnected system between FER-DPRK 
 
Also, the ROK and the DPRK are seeking to develop an industrial complex at GAESUNG, 
near the shared border of the two countries (but inside the DPRK). The required electricity 
for the GAESUNG industrial complex might be supplied by the ROK. This project is utterly 
dependent on the political situation between the two parties. At the first stage, the ROK and 
the DPRK agreed to construct two distribution circuits rated 210MW, which are now under 
construction. Finally, the basic rating of transmission line supplying electricity for the GAE-
SUNG industrial complex is 154Kv, 200 MW with a length of 40km. 
 
9.7.1.2 New scenarios including KEDO N/P   
Basically, KERI investigated new six interconnection scenarios for the “RFE-DPRK-ROK” intercon-
nection40. "Russia-DPRK-ROK" interconnection can present various scenarios according to the fol-
lowing factors and hypotheses.  
 
i.  Whether KEDO nuclear power plant is included in NEAREST or not.  
ii.  Accomplishment of "VLADIVOSTOK-CHEONGJIN” local interconnected system under dis-
connection to the DPRK system, and the future possibility of re-connection to the DPRK sys-
tem of CHEONGJIN load. 
iii. Power supply plan to GAESUNG industrial complex under disconnection to the DPRK sys-
tem and future possibility on re-connection to the DPRK system. 
iv. Capacity and voltage of the interconnected system. 
 
For example, in order to include the KEDO N/P in a power interconnection network, we 
can consider the interconnection route “VLADIVOSTOK-SINPO” as a tentative hypothesis. 
This scenario is somewhat different from the existing scenario for a “VLADIVOSTOK-
CHEONGJIN” interconnection that is under discussion between Russia and the DPRK. The 
“VLADIVOSTOK-SINPO” scenario could be one of the alternatives for the effective utiliza-
tion of the KEDO N/P. If this scenario is implemented, after the commissioning of KEDO 
N/P, by means of the interconnection the DPRK can earn revenues by trading seasonal sur-
plus electricity, or can be supported with electricity imports at times of seasonal shortages of 
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For example, in order to include the KEDO N/P in a power interconnection network, we 
can consider the interconnection route “VLADIVOSTOK-SINPO” as a tentative hypothesis. 
This scenario is somewhat different from the existing scenario for a “VLADIVOSTOK-
CHEONGJIN” interconnection that is under discussion between Russia and the DPRK. The 
“VLADIVOSTOK-SINPO” scenario could be one of the alternatives for the effective utiliza-
tion of the KEDO N/P. If this scenario is implemented, after the commissioning of KEDO 
N/P, by means of the interconnection the DPRK can earn revenues by trading seasonal sur-
plus electricity, or can be supported with electricity imports at times of seasonal shortages of 
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electricity. This implies that all of the interconnected countries in this scenario can reap ben-
efits by trading seasonal surplus electricity. 
 
9.7.2 Estimated prospective export/import potential 
 
9.7.2.1 Power industry of the ROK 
Table 9.9 describes the present status and future projections for installed generating capacity 
in the ROK according to the 1st power supply/demand plan after restructuring. The in-
stalled capacity is expected to rise to 77,024MW by 2015. In terms of the plant mix, the share 
of oil and coal plants are projected to decrease over the next 12 years, while the share of nuc-
lear capacity is projected to increase.  
 
Table 9.10 describes the present and future total electricity production in the ROK. As 
shown in this table, the expectation is that the total generation portion provided by nuclear 
power plants will rise slightly in the future. In contrast, the fraction of generation provided 
by thermal plants such as coal- and oil-fired units will decrease. 
 
Year Nuclear Coal Gas Oil Hydro SUM 
2002 
 
15716 
(29.2%) 
15931 
(29.6%) 
13618 
(25.3%) 
4660 
(8.7%) 
3876 
(7.2%) 53801 
2005 
 
17716 
(28.6%) 
18165 
(29.4%) 
16814 
(27.2%) 
4667 
(7.5%) 
4485 
(7.3%) 61847 
2010 
 
23116 
(29.3%) 
24265 
(30.7%) 
20437 
(25.9%) 
4817 
(6.1%) 
6385 
(8.1%) 72635 
2015 
 
26637 
(34.6%) 
22240 
(28.9%) 
19550 
(25.4%) 
2212 
(2.9%) 
6385 
(8.3%) 77024 
Table 9.9 Present and future projected generating capacity in the ROK (MW) 
 
Year Nuclear Coal Gas Oil Hydro Etc. SUM 
2002 
 
122.8 
(43.2%) 
117.9 
(41.5%) 
29.7 
(10.4%) 
26.7 
(2.8%) 
6.0 
(2.1%) 
- 
(0.0%) 344.8 
2005 
 
134.1 
(40.6%) 
132.7 
(40.2%) 
45.6 
(13.8%) 
24.8 
(2.9%) 
6.7 
(2.0%) 
1.4  
(0.4%)  399.0 
2010 
 
166.7 
(42.1%) 
175.2 
(44.3%) 
26.5 
(6.7%) 
17.9 
(4.5%) 
8.5 
(2.2%) 
1.0  
(0.3%) 435.0 
2015 
 
210.3 
(47.2%) 
165.4 
(37.1%) 
49.0 
(11.0%) 
12.0 
(2.7%) 
9.3 
(2.1%) -(0.0%) 445.9 
Table 9.10 Present and future projected electricity production in the ROK (TWh) 
 
Although the projections shown in Table 9.9 indicate that nuclear power’s share of future 
ROK installed capacity and electricity production are expected to be higher than they are at 
present, it should be noted that these projections should be considered just as long-term 
targets. Factors such as the shortage of land in the ROK suitable for nuclear plant construc-
tion, and public resistance to building power plants, especially nuclear plants (the "NIMBY", 
or "not in my back yard" movement) will likely make these targets difficult to achieve. As a 
result of the "NIMBY" movement in the ROK, and the public fear of atomic energy, construction of 
new nuclear power plants faces difficulties. Furthermore, building thermal power plants fueled with 
coal, oil and gas is problematic because of the constraints on GHG emissions specified under the 
Kyoto protocol. Therefore, as a matter of government policy, it is necessary to establish a future gen-
eral plan and countermeasures that will help to assure that future electricity demand is met, while 
still reducing GHG emissions.  
 
9.7.2.2 Power industry of DPRK 
Even though we have some DPRK power industry and power system data, most of the DPRK data 
is quite uncertain43. The DPRK had been suffering from electricity deficiency since the 1980s and 
most of its hydro/thermal plants are out of date. Because of this, the DPRK had not published formal 
statistics since the late 1990s, so we could not use existing outdated formal statistics when evaluating 
the prospect of the DPRK power balance. We could only estimate and treat the DPRK system as a 
black box. 
 
9.7.2.3 RFE power balance and export potential 
A study of the power export potential of East Russia (ER), including East Siberia (ES) and 
Russian Far East (RFE), up to 2020 was done in 44. In Tables 9.11-9.13, min/max value is 
based on the future minimum/maximum domestic demand. Three categories of power ex-
port potential are identified. The first one is power that can be additionally generated by 
existing power plants up to 2005. The second category of power export includes power from 
power plants that can be additionally generated during the summer season. The third cate-
gory of power export potential includes power generation from power plants that should be 
additionally constructed in ER for export purposes.  
 
Tables 9.11, 9.12 indicate power balances for the RFE interconnected power system compiled 
using data prepared by ESI for NEAREST DB. Hydropower capacity is supposed to be sig-
nificantly developed in the RFE, according to power balances in Tables 9.11, 9.12.  
Bureyskaya HPP, with total capacity of 2000 MW (6333 MW) and average yearly genera-
tion of 7.1 TWh, is constructed, with a third unit phased in by the end of 2004. Three more 
units were planned by 2009. Nizhne-Bureyskaya HPP, with total capacity of 428 MW (4107 
MW) and average yearly generation of 1.6 TWh, is the second stage of the Bureysk cascade 
of HPPs. It is supposed to be completed by 2010. Cascade of Nizhnezeysk HPPs, of an in-
stalled capacity and average power generation of 349 MW and 2,12 TWh/year respectively, 
will be completed in the period 2010-2012. Additionally Urgalsk HPP-1, with a power gen-
eration of 600 MW and 1.8 TWh/year, and Dalnerechensk hydropower complex, with a 
generation capacity of 595 MW and 1.4 TWh/year, are supposed to be introduced by 2015-
2020, depending on scenarios of rates of electricity consumption growth in the RFE. Steam 
TPPs are not supposed to be developed in the RFE. In fact, they are planned to retire, and new steam 
TPP capacity is not to be commissioned. Development of co-generation TPPs is mainly determined 
by the demand of heat consumers. 
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power plants that can be additionally generated during the summer season. The third cate-
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additionally constructed in ER for export purposes.  
 
Tables 9.11, 9.12 indicate power balances for the RFE interconnected power system compiled 
using data prepared by ESI for NEAREST DB. Hydropower capacity is supposed to be sig-
nificantly developed in the RFE, according to power balances in Tables 9.11, 9.12.  
Bureyskaya HPP, with total capacity of 2000 MW (6333 MW) and average yearly genera-
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stalled capacity and average power generation of 349 MW and 2,12 TWh/year respectively, 
will be completed in the period 2010-2012. Additionally Urgalsk HPP-1, with a power gen-
eration of 600 MW and 1.8 TWh/year, and Dalnerechensk hydropower complex, with a 
generation capacity of 595 MW and 1.4 TWh/year, are supposed to be introduced by 2015-
2020, depending on scenarios of rates of electricity consumption growth in the RFE. Steam 
TPPs are not supposed to be developed in the RFE. In fact, they are planned to retire, and new steam 
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Capacity, peak 
load and trans-
fer 
2001 
2005 2010 2015 2020 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Hydro 1.33 2.2 2.2 4.0 4.0 4.7 5.3 4.7 5.3 
Steam turbine 2.61 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.6 
Co-generation 3.17 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.8 4.3 5.4 5.4 
Nuclear - - - - - 0.6 0.6 1.3 1.3 
Total capaity 7.11 8.2 8.2 10.0 10.2 11.6 12.7 13.0 13.6 
Peak load 4.74 5.33 5.77 5.80 6.74 6.33 7.96 6.93 8.85 
Power tranfer to 
adjacent regions 0.04 0.32 0.35 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 
Peak load and 
power transfer 4.78 5.65 6.12 6.65 7.59 7.18 8.81 7.78 9.7 
Capacity re-
serve rate, % 48.7 45.1 34.0 50.4 34.4 61.6 44.2 67.1 40.2 
Table 9.11 Capacity balance for RFE IPS, GW 
 
Power generation, 
electricity con-
sumption and 
transfer 
 
2001 
 
 
2005 2010 2015 2020 
Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Hydro 4.85 8.9 8.9 13.7 13.7 16.3 16.3 17.0 19.0 
Steam turbine 6.05 6.8 6.8 5.2 6.6 4.9 7.7 1.2 3.0 
Co-generation 14.6 14.5 16.6 17.1 19.9 17.7 22.8 18.9 21.6 
Nuclear - - - - - - - 3.8 7.8 
Total genertion 25.5 30.2 32.3 36.0 40.2 38.9 46.8 40.9 51.4 
Electricity con-
sumption 25.2 28.5 30.6 31.5 35.7 34.4 42.3 37.4 46.9 
Electricity transfer 
to adjacent re-
gions 
0.29 1.7 1.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Electricity con-
sumption and 
transfer  
25.5 30.2 32.3 36.0 40.2 38.9 46.8 41.9 51.4 
Table 9.12 Electricity balance for RFE IPS, TWh/year 
 
As can be seen from Table 9.13, power export potential, which does not require additional 
capacity commissioning (apart from that required for meeting domestic power loads), and, 
therefore, additional investment, can be quite sufficient, exceeding 4 GW of capacity in 
summer, and 2 GW in winter, and 16-18 TWh/year of power generation in the beginning of 
the period under consideration. At the end of the considered period, export potential de-
clines to about 2.5-3.0 GW of capacity in summer only (because of exhausting existing exces-
sive capacity), and 5-6 TWh/year of power generation.  
 
 
 
Potential 2005 2010 2015 2020 Min Max Min Max Min Max 
Ca
pac
ity
, 
GW
 Winter 2.4  1.2 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Summer 4.3  3.3 2.8 3.0 2.9 2.5 3.2 
Power generation, TWh 18.1  11.5 7.4 8.6 5.8 5.0 6.4 
Table 9.13 Total RFE Power Export Potential of Existing Plants 
 
Power plants Installed  capacity, GW 
Annual average 
generation, TWh Years of commissioning 
Hy
dro
 
Bureysk (together with 
Nizhne-reysk) 
 
2.428 
 
8.7 
 
By 2010 
 
Cascade of 
 Nizhnezeysk 
0.349 2.12 By 2015 
Dalnerechensk 0.595 1.4 By 2015 
Urgalsk-1 0.6 1.8 By 2015 
Subtotal 3.972 14.02 - 
Nu
cle
ar  Primorye 
 
 
1.3 
 
 
9.75 
 
By 2020 
- 
Total 5.27 23.77 - 
Table 9.14 Power plant capacities to be commissioned in RFE by 2020 
 
Power plants Installed capacity, GW Average yearly generation, TWh 
Hy
dro
 
Urgalsk-1 0-0.6 0-1.8 
Gilyuisk 0.38 1.15 
South Yakutian hydropow-
er complex, including: 5.0 23.45 
Cascade of Sredne-Uchursk 
and Uchursk HPPs 3.7 17.2 
Cascade of Idjeksk and 
Timtonsk HPPs 1.3 6.25 
Khingansk 1.2 5.8 
Subtotal 6.58-7.18 30.4-32.2 
Th
erm
al 
Sakhalin (Gas) 4.0 26.0 
Sakhalin (Coal) 2.0 13.0 
Urgalsk (Coal) 1.2 7.5 
Subtotal 7.2 46.5 
Nu
cle
ar Far East 2.5 18 
Total 16.28-16.88 94.9-96.7 
Table 9.15 Power Plant Capacities to be commissioned in RFE after 2020 
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Table 9.14 and Table 9.15 shows prospective power plants, which can be constructed within 
(or close to) the area of the RFE IPS in and beyond 2020. As can be seen from Table 9.15, the 
total power potential of the third category can exceed 16 GW and 95 TWh/year. In addition 
to this potential, construction of the Tugursk tidal power plant, with a capacity of nearly 7 
GW and a yearly power generation of 17 TWh, can be possible beyond 2025-2030. 
 
9.7.3 Admissible Interconnected Capacity in Technical Viewpoints 
 
9.7.3.1 Evaluation of maximum exchangeable power 
An evaluation of maximum exchangeable power was performed by KERI45, 46. It can be evaluated by 
taking into account the following technical aspects, such as ROW (Right of Way) and system con-
straints. ROW constraint means the geographical constraints that the interconnected line should pass 
through. Also, system constraints include technical problems, such as load flow and stability analy-
sis. The study results of technical aspects are as follows. 
 
ROW constraint: Considering the geographical situation between Russia and the Korean 
peninsula, a two-bipole system having a capacity of 7 GW can be built.  
 
Load flow analysis: There is no violation of overload and voltage in a steady state up to  
7 GW of inflow power. However, in N-1 contingency, some violations happen as the inflow 
power exceeds 4 GW. Therefore, 4 GW seems to be the maximum exchangeable power.  
 
Dynamic analysis: The power system frequency of the ROK can keep the standard when 
losing 2 GW of power. However, loss of more than 3 GW of power makes frequency violate 
the standard. Considering a one-bipole trip, 4 GW is the maximum exchangeable power.  
 
Finally, we can say that 4 GW of power exchange is the maximum exchangeable power from 
a technical viewpoint between Russia and the ROK at present status, and this result could 
satisfy the security points. 
 
9.7.3.2 Evaluation of minimum exchangeable power 
Minimum exchangeable power is evaluated through a comparison of total costs and benefits 
of the interconnected line during its life cycle span of 30 years. The total cost of intercon-
nected lines, life cycle costs, consist of initial investment and operating costs. Initial costs 
include the construction cost of transmission lines and converter stations, operating costs 
means the maintenance costs of transmission lines and converter stations. The benefit of 
interconnection comes from the electricity tariff difference between the ROK and Russia. 
The electricity tariff difference in 2000 was $0.0383/kWh, but this difference has been get-
ting decreased because the annual rate of increase for electricity tariffs in Russia will be 
higher than that of the ROK. Table 9.16 shows the total cost and benefits of interconnected 
lines. If 1 GW or 2 GW of power is exchanged between the ROK and Russia, the total cost is 
much more than the accrued benefits, a situation that cannot assure an economic advantage. 
However, more than 3 GW of exchange power can guarantee the interconnection project 
will be in the black. Therefore, we can propose that minimum exchangeable power, from an 
economic viewpoint, will be 3 GW. 
 
Exchange 
power Cost (billion $) Benefit (billion $) 
1GW 4.13 3.16 
2GW 6.60 6.33 
3GW 7.82 9.49 
4GW 10.56 12.65 
Table 9.16 Total cost and benefits 
 
Benefits are affected by a decrease in the rate of electricity tariff differences between the 
ROK and Russia. The lower the decreasing rate is, the more we can expect benefits. Figure 
9.19 shows the sensitivity of benefits with variations of the decrease rate. In this figure, the 
horizontal axis is the decrease rate and vertical axis shows benefits. In the case of 1GW of 
exchange power, the benefit is $5.24billion, with a 1% decreasing rate, but the benefit is re-
duced to $2.11billion with a 9% decreasing rate. With a 5% decreasing rate, more than 3GW 
of exchange power is needed to assure economic feasibility. More than 1GW of exchange 
power, with a 1% decreasing rate makes the interconnection project beneficial, but if de-
creasing rate increases over 7%, the cost is larger than the benefit with 1 GW to 4 GW of ex-
change power. Figure 9.20 shows the Benefit/Cost ratio with a 5% decreasing rate. In this 
figure, the horizontal axis means exchange power and vertical axis means B/C ratio. As ex-
change power grows, B/C ratio also increases up to 3 GW. However, B/C ratio decreases 
from more than 4 GW, as shown in Figure 9.20. So, we can say that ranging from 3 GW to  
4 GW is a more reasonable exchange power in economic terms. 
 
As a result, the minimum exchangeable power is about 3GW, and optimal exchangeable 
power range, considering technical and economic viewpoints, is expected to 3~4 GW. 
 
 
Figure 9.19 Sensitivity of benefit to variations in decreasing rate. 
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Table 9.14 and Table 9.15 shows prospective power plants, which can be constructed within 
(or close to) the area of the RFE IPS in and beyond 2020. As can be seen from Table 9.15, the 
total power potential of the third category can exceed 16 GW and 95 TWh/year. In addition 
to this potential, construction of the Tugursk tidal power plant, with a capacity of nearly 7 
GW and a yearly power generation of 17 TWh, can be possible beyond 2025-2030. 
 
9.7.3 Admissible Interconnected Capacity in Technical Viewpoints 
 
9.7.3.1 Evaluation of maximum exchangeable power 
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sis. The study results of technical aspects are as follows. 
 
ROW constraint: Considering the geographical situation between Russia and the Korean 
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Load flow analysis: There is no violation of overload and voltage in a steady state up to  
7 GW of inflow power. However, in N-1 contingency, some violations happen as the inflow 
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Dynamic analysis: The power system frequency of the ROK can keep the standard when 
losing 2 GW of power. However, loss of more than 3 GW of power makes frequency violate 
the standard. Considering a one-bipole trip, 4 GW is the maximum exchangeable power.  
 
Finally, we can say that 4 GW of power exchange is the maximum exchangeable power from 
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9.7.3.2 Evaluation of minimum exchangeable power 
Minimum exchangeable power is evaluated through a comparison of total costs and benefits 
of the interconnected line during its life cycle span of 30 years. The total cost of intercon-
nected lines, life cycle costs, consist of initial investment and operating costs. Initial costs 
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means the maintenance costs of transmission lines and converter stations. The benefit of 
interconnection comes from the electricity tariff difference between the ROK and Russia. 
The electricity tariff difference in 2000 was $0.0383/kWh, but this difference has been get-
ting decreased because the annual rate of increase for electricity tariffs in Russia will be 
higher than that of the ROK. Table 9.16 shows the total cost and benefits of interconnected 
lines. If 1 GW or 2 GW of power is exchanged between the ROK and Russia, the total cost is 
much more than the accrued benefits, a situation that cannot assure an economic advantage. 
However, more than 3 GW of exchange power can guarantee the interconnection project 
will be in the black. Therefore, we can propose that minimum exchangeable power, from an 
economic viewpoint, will be 3 GW. 
 
Exchange 
power Cost (billion $) Benefit (billion $) 
1GW 4.13 3.16 
2GW 6.60 6.33 
3GW 7.82 9.49 
4GW 10.56 12.65 
Table 9.16 Total cost and benefits 
 
Benefits are affected by a decrease in the rate of electricity tariff differences between the 
ROK and Russia. The lower the decreasing rate is, the more we can expect benefits. Figure 
9.19 shows the sensitivity of benefits with variations of the decrease rate. In this figure, the 
horizontal axis is the decrease rate and vertical axis shows benefits. In the case of 1GW of 
exchange power, the benefit is $5.24billion, with a 1% decreasing rate, but the benefit is re-
duced to $2.11billion with a 9% decreasing rate. With a 5% decreasing rate, more than 3GW 
of exchange power is needed to assure economic feasibility. More than 1GW of exchange 
power, with a 1% decreasing rate makes the interconnection project beneficial, but if de-
creasing rate increases over 7%, the cost is larger than the benefit with 1 GW to 4 GW of ex-
change power. Figure 9.20 shows the Benefit/Cost ratio with a 5% decreasing rate. In this 
figure, the horizontal axis means exchange power and vertical axis means B/C ratio. As ex-
change power grows, B/C ratio also increases up to 3 GW. However, B/C ratio decreases 
from more than 4 GW, as shown in Figure 9.20. So, we can say that ranging from 3 GW to  
4 GW is a more reasonable exchange power in economic terms. 
 
As a result, the minimum exchangeable power is about 3GW, and optimal exchangeable 
power range, considering technical and economic viewpoints, is expected to 3~4 GW. 
 
 
Figure 9.19 Sensitivity of benefit to variations in decreasing rate. 
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Figure 9.20 B/C Ratio with a 5% decreasing rate. 
 
Thus, above study examines the future outlook of exchange power between the ROK, the 
DPRK and RFE from technical and economic viewpoints. The main results of this study on 
power system interconnection are as follows. 
 
1. Excessive capacity and power generation for the RFE system was estimated in the paper. 
Power export potential, which does not require additional capacity commissioning and, 
therefore, additional investment, can be quite sufficient exceeding 4 GW of capacity in 
summer, 2 GW of capacity in winter, and 16-18 TWh/year of power generation at the be-
ginning of the considered period. At the end of the considered period, the export potential 
declines to about 2.5-3.0 GW of capacity only in summer (because of exhausting existing 
excessive capacity) and 5-6 TWh/year of power generation. The total power exports poten-
tial, including new commissioning plants can exceed 16 GW and 95 TWh/year. In addition to this 
potential, construction of the Tugursk tidal power plant, with a capacity of nearly 7 GW and yearly 
power generation of 17 TWh, can be possible beyond 2025-2030.  
 
2. The maximum acceptable exchange power between Russia and the ROK at present status, 
from a technical viewpoint, is 4 GW and this result could satisfy security points. In addition 
to maximum exchangeable power, the minimum exchangeable power, by comparing total 
costs and benefits of interconnected lines, is evaluated at 3GW. At this time, we can say that 
the range of 3 GW to 4 GW seems to be a reasonable power exchange level between the ROK 
and RFE systems. 
 
3. This study is based on a hypothesis, and research concepts, not on practical engineering 
projects. Therefore, more detailed engineering work from the technical and economic view-
points are required for the realization of NEAREST. Above all, we could not estimate the 
prospect for the DPRK system because we have no accurate DPRK power industry data and, 
consequently, the exact details are uncertain. 
 
9.8 Northeast Asia Interconnection, and Power Flow  
Considering Seasonal Load Patterns  
Economical and technical considerations are usually the underlying factors for interconnecting elec-
tric power systems. Among some of the benefits that may be realized are plant capacity savings, in-
B/
C R
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o 
terchange due to diversity, emergency power interchange, spinning reserve savings. Development of 
such ties in the future can result in more effective utilization of power stations installed capacities, 
fuel economy, to improvement of ecological situation in a region.  
 
However, the planning of interconnection is a demanding task and needs to meet a wide 
range of technical aspects. The interconnection of the power systems among North-East 
Asian countries (Russia, China, Mongolia, Japan, and Korea) has been proposed on numer-
ous occasions, but little progress has been made due to the complicated political issues and 
economical problems involved. Interstate electrical ties of power systems of the Northeast 
Asia countries now practically are not developed. Now, the necessity for this power system 
interconnection is increasingly being felt due to the benefit of each country. Because of these 
reasons, Korea peninsula takes the role connect a bridge between different areas of North-
east Asia, such as Russia, Mongolia, China, and Japan47-51. The problem of utilizing 
2,000MW power output after the successful construction for the Sinpo nuclear power plant 
in future has been studied, and a 765 kV HVAC interconnection between South Korea and 
North Korea has been discussed with several papers52-58.  
 
In South Korea, the potential increase in power demand is higher than that of any other 
country. The metropolitan area situated in the central parts consumed nearly 43% of the 
total electricity generated, and the southeast area consumed about 33%.  
 
However, most of the large-scale power plants have been constructed in the southern part of 
South Korea. Consequently, the existing power grid includes multiple routes designed to 
supply the metropolitan area so that, by and large, the direction of power flow is toward the 
north. The future substitutes are to relieving the problems of power imbalance and the 
shortage of power in the Seoul metropolitan areas in South Korea and the Pyongyang met-
ropolitan areas in North Korea.  
 
In this Section, we present various scenarios and the accompanying power flow analyses 
considering on seasonal load patterns, in order to provide the interconnection of the electric 
power grids. A distribution map of the projected power flow will be drawn by the results of 
simulations performed using the PSS/E tool. 
 
9.8.1 Power System Status and Seasonal Load Patterns in Northeast Asia 
In this Subsection, we will explain the general characteristics and the seasonal load patterns of the 
existing power systems used in South Korea, North Korea, Russia, China, and Japan59-66. 
 
9.8.1.1 Power system and seasonal load patterns in South Korea 
The South Korean electricity generation system can be divided into 7 geographical areas that 
take geographical boundaries into account. The transmission voltages used are 345kV for 
the major networks, and 154kV or 66kV for the local systems. Most 66kV lines are now ei-
ther being removed or replaced by higher voltage lines. Power system on Jeju Island is now 
connected to the mainland via a 100km-long submarine transmission system, comprised of 
HVDC (High Voltage Direct Current) cables. Because the power demand is increasing ra-
pidly in the metropolitan area, 765kV facilities are in the process of being constructed and 
now come into operation in order to provide a stable large-scale power transmission be-
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tween the large power generation plants and the areas where the consumers are located. 
Figure 9.21 represent the load curve for day and the load curve for month in South Korea. 
 
Table 9.17 shows the current status of KEPCO’s transmission grid facilities at the end of 
2001. Table 9.18 represents a mid-to-long term forecast in demand and supply. Table 9.19 
shows a power capacity of 6 generating companies in South Korea, 2002. (The bellow data 
had obtained from KEPCO in Korea) Figure 9.22 represents a load demand and a generating 
facility capacity for districts.  
 
9.8.1.2 Power system and seasonal load patterns in North Korea 
Figure 9.23 represents the load curve for day and the load curve for month with the assumed materi-
al in North Korea. As shown in bellow Figure, the pattern of a curve has a flat and small variation. 
 
  
 
(a) Daily load curve 
 
  
(b) Monthly load curve 
Figure 9.21 South Korea load curves for day and for month. 
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 (At the end of 2001) 
 
Transmission Facilities Substation Facilities 
Circuit length (C-km) Support 
(ea) 
Number of 
substation 
(ea) 
Transformer 
capacity 
(MVA) Ovehead Underground Total 
765 kV 662 - 662 666 1 1,110 
345 kV 7,234 111 7,345 9,914 65 63,577 
180 kV(HVDC) 30 202 232 553 - - 
154 kV 16,111 1,465 17,576 24,581 449 78,119 
66 kV 1,531 9 1,540 7,112 25 1,225 
22 kV - - - - 9 248 
Total 24,037 1,778 25,815 42,826 540 144,279 
Table 9.17 Current status of KEPCO’s transmission grid facilities 
 
Year Peak Demand [MW] 
Installed Capacity [MW, as of year end] (%) Capacity 
Margin [%] Nuclear Coal LNG Oil Hydro Total 
2001 
(Record) 43,130 
13,720 
(27.0) 
15,530 
(30.5) 
12,870 
(25.3) 
4,870 
(9.6) 
3,880 
(7.6) 
50,860 
(100) 15.1 
2005 51,860 17,720 (28.6) 
18,170 
(29.3) 
16,810 
(27.2) 
4,670 
(7.6) 
4,490 
(7.3) 
61,850 
(100) 16.8 
2010 60,620 23,120 (29.2) 
24,270 
(30.7) 
20,440 
(25.9) 
4,820 
(6.1) 
6,390 
(8.1) 
79,020 
(100) 25.1 
Table 9.18 Mid-to-long term forecast in demand and supply 
 
Company Base (MW) 
Middle 
(MW) 
Peak 
 (MW) 
Total 
(MW) 
KOSEPCO 3,565 500 1,500 5,565 
KOMIPO 3,400 0 3,337 6,737 
KOWEPO 3,066 1,400 2,880 7,346 
KOSPO 3,000 400 2,200 5,600 
KEWESPO 2,900 1,800 2,800 7,500 
KHNP 15,715 0 528 16,243 
OTHERS 0 58 4,186 4,244 
TOTAL 31,646 4,158 17,431 53,235 
% 59.5 7.8 32.7 100 
Table 9.19 Power capacity for generation companies in South Korea, 2002 
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(a) Daily load curve 
 
  
(b) Monthly load curve 
Figure 9.21 South Korea load curves for day and for month. 
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Figure 9.22 Demand and facility capacity by regions 
 
At present, the data about transmission system of North Korea are insufficient and are not 
arranged well. There are only a little data from Russia, UN, CIA, the Korean Board of Unifi-
cation, etc. Accordingly, the previous researches of interconnection in the Korean Peninsula 
have just focused on the analyses of the present data and scenarios. This study assumes that 
the power system in North Korea is divided into 5 areas. The power system in North Korea 
is smaller than that in South Korea. Most of the hydroelectric power plants are located in the 
hilly region of the northern areas in North Korea and most of the thermoelectric power 
plants are located in the metropolitan area. Moreover, power capacity in North Korea has 
been estimated to be approximately 7,000MW. Currently, it is known that transmission line voltage is 
composed of 110kV and 220kV. 
 
 
 
 
* The information in this Figure was obtained from KEPCO. 
 
 
(a) Daily load curve 
  
(b) Monthly load curve 
Figure 9.23 North Korea load curves for day and month (Assumed Material) 
 
9.8.1.3 Power system and seasonal load patterns in Far East Russia 
The above data had been obtained from SEI in Russia. Table 9.20 represents a present seasonal data 
of power in Russia (2001). Table 9.21 is a present seasonal data of power in East Siberia (2001). Table 
9.22 shows a present seasonal data of power in Russian Far East (2001). 
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Figure 9.23 North Korea load curves for day and month (Assumed Material) 
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Type Present seasonal data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 45.3 48.0 41.7 40.9 175.9 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear 33.3 27.7 36.8 39.1 136.9 
Thermal 140.9 105.2 146.5 185.9 578.5 
Including  Conventional steam turbine 56.9 46.2 64.4 80.7 248.3 
 Co-generation     83.4 58.6 81.6 104.5 328.0 
Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 219.5 180.9 225.0 265.9 891.3 
Table 9.20 Present seasonal data of power in Russia (2001, TWh) 
 
Type Present seasonal Data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 22.0 26.4 24.2 22.3 94.9 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Thermal 9.9 3.9 8.7 14.3 36.8 
Including Conventional steam turbine 5.1 1.0 4.1 8.4 18.6 
 Co-generation 4.8 2.9 4.6 5.9 18.2 
     Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 31.9 30.3 32.9 36.6 131.7 
Table 9.21 Present seasonal data of power in East Siberia (2001, TWh) 
 
Unified Power System (UPS) of Russian East provides with the electric power the most in-
habited and industrially developed regions of the Russian Far East. UPS of Russian East 
consist of seven large regional electric power systems: Amur, Far East, Kamchatka, Maga-
dan, Sakhalin, Khabarovsk and Yakutsk. Now the Amur, Khabarovsk and Far East electric 
power systems are united on parallel operation, in parallel with them the southern part of 
the Yakut electric power system is working also. The maximum of electric loading in UPS 
falls at winter and makes about 5.8 GW (based on the data for 2001). The minimum of elec-
tric loadings makes approximately half from a maximum and falls at the summer period. 
The maximum of in UPS was in 1990 and made approximately 30 billion kWh. In 2000 value 
of electrical energy consumption has made approximately 24 billion kWh, in 2001 this value 
has made 25.5 billion kWh. It was planned, that by 2005 consumption will make about 28.7 
billion kWh by 2010 - 32 billion kWh, and by 2025 will make about 50 billion kWh.  
Type Present seasonal Data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 1.13 0.98 0.97 1.77 4.85 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Thermal 5.29 3.57 5.04 6.75 20.65 
Including  Conventional steam turbine 1.54 1.27 1.52 1.72 6.05 
 Co-generation     3.75 2.30 3.52 5.03 14.60 
Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 6.42 4.55 6.01 8.52 25.50 
Table 9.22 Present seasonal data of power in Russian Far East (2001, TWh) 
 
The current consumption is distributed non-uniformly. More than 40 % of the electric power is 
consumed in the Far East electric power system. The rest of 60% are distributed between the 
Khabarovsk, Amur and Yakut electric power systems. Backbone electrical network of the UPS 
consist of 220 and 500 kV transmission lines. General extent of 500 kV lines makes about 2000 km 
The total installed capacity of power stations (nuclear, thermal and hydro) make about 11 GW59. 
Figure 9.24 represents the HVDC interconnection lines in Siberia and Far East Russia50. 
 
9.8.1.4 Power system status in North East China 
Figure 9.25 represents the seven regions and power consumption map in China. This Figure was 
obtained from EPRI in China. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.24 HVDC Interconnection Lines in Siberia and Far East Russia 
 
This map shows an overview of the different regional grid systems within China, showing 
year 2002 generating capacities and outputs in each region, as well as indicating intercon-
nections between regional grids. In China, Liaoning’s power network covering the 147,500 
square kilometers of land is a modern power network with long history and full of vigor. 
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Type Present seasonal data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 45.3 48.0 41.7 40.9 175.9 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear 33.3 27.7 36.8 39.1 136.9 
Thermal 140.9 105.2 146.5 185.9 578.5 
Including  Conventional steam turbine 56.9 46.2 64.4 80.7 248.3 
 Co-generation     83.4 58.6 81.6 104.5 328.0 
Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 219.5 180.9 225.0 265.9 891.3 
Table 9.20 Present seasonal data of power in Russia (2001, TWh) 
 
Type Present seasonal Data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 22.0 26.4 24.2 22.3 94.9 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Thermal 9.9 3.9 8.7 14.3 36.8 
Including Conventional steam turbine 5.1 1.0 4.1 8.4 18.6 
 Co-generation 4.8 2.9 4.6 5.9 18.2 
     Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 31.9 30.3 32.9 36.6 131.7 
Table 9.21 Present seasonal data of power in East Siberia (2001, TWh) 
 
Unified Power System (UPS) of Russian East provides with the electric power the most in-
habited and industrially developed regions of the Russian Far East. UPS of Russian East 
consist of seven large regional electric power systems: Amur, Far East, Kamchatka, Maga-
dan, Sakhalin, Khabarovsk and Yakutsk. Now the Amur, Khabarovsk and Far East electric 
power systems are united on parallel operation, in parallel with them the southern part of 
the Yakut electric power system is working also. The maximum of electric loading in UPS 
falls at winter and makes about 5.8 GW (based on the data for 2001). The minimum of elec-
tric loadings makes approximately half from a maximum and falls at the summer period. 
The maximum of in UPS was in 1990 and made approximately 30 billion kWh. In 2000 value 
of electrical energy consumption has made approximately 24 billion kWh, in 2001 this value 
has made 25.5 billion kWh. It was planned, that by 2005 consumption will make about 28.7 
billion kWh by 2010 - 32 billion kWh, and by 2025 will make about 50 billion kWh.  
Type Present seasonal Data Year Spring Summer Autumn Winter 
Hydro Hydro 1.13 0.98 0.97 1.77 4.85 Pumped-storage power 
Nuclear - - - - - 
Thermal 5.29 3.57 5.04 6.75 20.65 
Including  Conventional steam turbine 1.54 1.27 1.52 1.72 6.05 
 Co-generation     3.75 2.30 3.52 5.03 14.60 
Renewable energy - - - - - 
Total 6.42 4.55 6.01 8.52 25.50 
Table 9.22 Present seasonal data of power in Russian Far East (2001, TWh) 
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Liaoning province is the power load center in Northeast China. It has one 500kV line and six 
220kV lines to connect with the power network in Jilin province. It also has two 500kV lines 
and one 220kV line to connect with eastern part of an Inner Mongolia. By the end of 2000, 
the total installed capacity in Liaoning province was 15,185MW (hydro power: 1,156MW; 
thermal power: 12,559MW). The total installed capacity of the wholly-owned and holding 
power generation plants of Liaoning Electric Power Co., Ltd. is 2,854MW (hydro power: 
456MW; thermal power: 2,398MW) and takes up 18.8% of the total installed capacity of the 
whole province. The independent power generation company has a total installed capacity 
of 10,861MW (hydro power: 488MW; thermal power: 10,373MW) and takes up 71.5%. The 
local self-supply power plants have a total installed capacity of 3,006MW, taking up 19.8%. 
The installed capacity of the plant at Sino-Korean boundary river is 545MW, taking up 3.6%. 
 
 
Figure 9.25 Regional power consumption map in China 
 
9.8.1.5 Power System Status and Seasonal Load Patterns of Kyushu in Japan 
Japan’s power system is divided into 9 regional companies serving the areas of Hokkaido, 
Tohoku, Tokyo, Chubu, Hokuriku, Kansai, Shikoku, Chugoku, and Kyushu, and transmis-
sion consists of 500kV, 220kV, 110kV, and DC 250kV lines. Figure 9.26 shows a cascade 
power flow map in Japan. The information in this Figure was obtained from 65. 
 
 
Figure 9.26 Cascade power flow map in Japan 
 
The frequency used is 60Hz in the western part and 50Hz in the eastern part of the country. 
According to statistics published in 2001, the total generating capacity of the nine power 
companies is 33,765MW due to hydropower, 118,112MW due to thermal power, and 
42,300MW due to nuclear power. The total capacity is therefore 194,177MW.  
 
Kyushu’s infrastructure is composed of nuclear, thermal, hydro, and geothermal power ge-
nerating plants. In Kyushu region of Japan, 2001, summer peak has 16,743[MW], and winter 
peak has 12,961[MW]. The nuclear power plants are located both in the southwest coastal 
region and at the furthermost tip of Kyushu’s northwest coast. The thermal power plants are 
located mainly on Kyushu’s northeast and the northwest coasts. The hydro power plants are 
randomly distributed within the north and south central regions. The geothermal power 
plants are located in the north and south central regions. Among these regions, Kyushu has 
a total land area of 42,163 km2 and is located in the southernmost part of Japan. The generat-
ing capacity of Kyushu’s Electric Power Company is approximately 30,200MW. The back-
bone of its transmission system consists of 500kV, 220kV, and some 110kV lines. 
 
9.8.2 Assumed Possible Interconnection Scenarios in North East Asia 
Several cases of maps are drawn according to the assumed scenario in Figure 9.27, which 
has possible scenarios among Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan.  
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9.8.2 Assumed Possible Interconnection Scenarios in North East Asia 
Several cases of maps are drawn according to the assumed scenario in Figure 9.27, which 
has possible scenarios among Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan.  
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 (a) Separation for North Korea and South.                (b) North Korea-South Korea 
 (c) North Korea-South Korea-Japan.             (d) Russia-North Korea-South Korea-Japan 
 (e) Russia-Mongo-China-South Korea-Japan.  (f) China-North Korea-South Korea-Japan 
 (g) Russia-Mongo-China-South Korea-Japan. (h) Russia-Mongo-China-South Korea-Japan 
 
Figure 9.27 Possible scenarios among Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan 
9.8.3 Assumed Seasonal Power exchange Quantity for Power Flow Calculation 
Table 9.23 represents the assumed peak load data for summer and winter in South Korea, 
2005. To simulation the PSS/E package, the load was decreased with 2,000MW in summer 
season and decreased with 1,000MW in winter season. Table 9.24 has the assumed peak data 
for summer and winter in North Korea, 2005. All the load and supply patterns were as-
sumed with constant quantity. Table 9.25 is the assumed peak data for summer and winter 
at Kyushu in Japan, 2001. Table 9.26 has the assumed export power for summer and winter 
in Far East Russia. Table 9.27 represents the assumed export power for summer and winter 
in North East China.  
 
Thus, the purpose of this Section was to execute a power flow analysis considering seasonal 
load patterns for the increase or for the decrease of a reserve power for the future power 
shortages faced by the metropolitan areas or by the southeastern area of the South Korea in 
North-East Asia. Several cases were considered as follows: 
 
● Securing South Korea’s power reserve by a power interchange considering seasonal effects 
in North East Asia countries. 
● Drawing possible scenarios and power flow maps for relieving the power shortages faced 
by the metropolitan areas and southeastern area in Korean Peninsula.  
● Considering seasonal load patterns and studying power flow for the interconnection with 
2,000MW in Far-East Russia or in Northeast China, and 1,000MW in Japan to utilizing re-
mote power sources. 
 
The preliminary considerations above consist only of a scenario-based power flow analysis 
included with seasonal load patterns; however, the results of this research may be referred 
to the government for use in the establishment of a future construction plan for the power 
system in South Korea. Moreover, these may be expecting to improve political and economi-
cal relationships in North East Asia countries.  
 
Seasons Generation [MW] Load [MW] Receive Power [MW] 
Summer peak 51857.8 51,090.4 2,000+1,000 
Winter peak 41,857.8 41,090.4 1,000+500 
Table 9.23 Assumed peak data for summer and winter in South Korea, 2005 
 
Seasons Generation [MW] Load [MW] Transmission P [MW] 
Summer peak 9,000 9,000 - 
Winter peak 9,000 9,000 - 
Table 9.24 Assumed peak data for summer and winter in North Korea, 2005 
 
Seasons Generation [MW] 
Load 
[MW] 
Transmission Power 
(Japan → Korea) 
Summer peak 17,743 16,743 1,000 
Winter peak 13,461 12,961 500 
Table 9.25 Assumed peak data for summer and winter at Kyushu in Japan, 2001 
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Seasons Generation  [MW] 
Load  
[MW] 
Transmission Power 
(Russia → Korea) 
Summer peak 2,000 0 2,000 
Winter peak 1,000 0 1,000 
Table 9.26 Assumed export power for summer and winter in Far East Russia 
 
Seasons Generation  [MW] 
Load  
[MW] 
Transmission Power 
(China → Korea) 
Summer peak 2,000 0 2,000 
Winter peak 1,000 0 1,000 
Table 9.27 Assumed export power for summer and winter in North east China 
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Seasons Generation  [MW] 
Load  
[MW] 
Transmission Power 
(Russia → Korea) 
Summer peak 2,000 0 2,000 
Winter peak 1,000 0 1,000 
Table 9.26 Assumed export power for summer and winter in Far East Russia 
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Table 9.27 Assumed export power for summer and winter in North east China 
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